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Abstract
This thesis analyzes Germany’s far-left and far-right football subcultures and how their
expressions are shaped by Germany’s laws, policies, and social taboos. After World War II,
Germany’s efforts to overcome or to work through its history of political extremism and
authoritarian governments (Vergangenheitsbewältigung/Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung) has
resulted in laws and policies intended to restore Germany’s national image, protect democratic
institutions, and prevent another mass atrocity like the Holocaust. These laws are against
political extremism as a whole, including left-wing political extremism, but many of these laws
are aimed at restricting far-right political extremism de jure because they address hate speech.
However, despite these restrictions, Germany has one of the highest rates of violent far-right
extremism in Europe. One of the reasons for this is that the far-right has been able to express
hateful sentiments, recruit, and communicate with one another through utilizing what author and
professor Cynthia Miller-Idriss refers to as “game-playing” with the restrictions set in place. For
decades, football has been used as a tool for expressing political sentiments and political
recruitment. Using journalistic articles, academic analyses, and written narratives in conjunction
with legal texts and commentary, this thesis expands on Miller-Idriss’s work and analyzes how
far-left and far-right football fans respectively game-play with Germany’s laws and policies
addressing political extremism through utilizing cultural objects and collective actions like
banners, stickers, clothing, and chants. This thesis reaches the conclusion that these cultural
objects and collective actions are enabling unique, complex routes of politically-oriented
expression in Germany.
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Introduction: Teams of Focus
It’s a strange one. Football is the vehicle upon which so much of the St. Pauli experience
hangs, yet once you are here, the football part seems so insignificant. It’s about people
giving a toss about each other. About showing that we care, that governments and their
policies are wrong. It’s not about nations or borders, it’s about 10,000 people marching
together or 22 people from different backgrounds and cultures coming together through
football to show that they appreciate each other. It’s bloody powerful and I’m proud to
play a tiny part in it.1
In his book Pirates, Punks & Politics, author and football fanatic Nick Davidson provides
a comprehensive analysis of the Hamburg-based, “Kult” football club FC St. Pauli. Davidson
dives into the coach changes of St. Pauli throughout recent years, memorializes high-energy
moments when players scored last-minute points, and goes over the promotions and relegations
of the team through the various levels of German football. However, St. Pauli—a team that
struggles to occasionally stay briefly in the top level of German football, or the
Bundesliga—does not have books written about it for its football performance. Rather, football is
the base on which St. Pauli’s unique, internationally-lauded left-wing fan subculture builds.
From large banners reading “REFUGEES ARE WELCOME HERE” to thousands of fans
demonstrating in the streets for refugees’ rights, this is a team whose fans’ unorthodox actions
and rhetoric go beyond the playing field by loudly and proudly standing against racism,
xenophobia, homophobia, sexism, and fascism.

1

Nick Davidson, Pirates, Punks & Politics: FC. St Pauli: Falling in Love with a Radical Football Club (York:
SportsBooks Ltd, 2014), 244-245.
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FC St. Pauli fans hold a pro-refugee banner during a game.2

FC St. Pauli is not the only football fan team in Germany with a “loud and proud”
politically-oriented fan scene. This thesis will analyze St. Pauli fans and other teams with far-left
and far-right fans, looking at their cultural objects—such as banners and tee shirts—and
collective actions. The central argument of this thesis is an extension of the work of author and
professor Cynthia Miller-Idriss, who argues in her book The Extreme Gone Mainstream:
Commercialization and Far Right Youth Culture in Germany that bans on far-right ideological
symbols results in a “game-playing” from those who wear the banned symbols. That is, those
who wear these symbols will change their “codes and their display to navigate bans of particular
symbols,” showing how banning policies can actually backfire.3 However, Miller-Idriss' concept

2

“St. Pauli: German football's cult club explained,” Bundesliga, last modified 2019,
https://www.bundesliga.com/en/bundesliga/news/st-pauli-hamburg-cult-club-explained-max-kruse-reeperbahn-song2-millerntor-2896-1471.
3
Cynthia Miller-Idriss, The Extreme Gone Mainstream: Commercialization and Far Right Youth Culture in
Germany (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2021), 20.
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of “game-playing” also applies more broadly to politically-oriented football subcultures, going
beyond clothing, going beyond symbols, and going beyond commercialized objects; this thesis
also goes beyond Miller-Idriss’ book by applying psychological topics for explanation and
intervention. It is important to look at political cultures in other domains because football fans'
cultural objects and collective actions, for example, can even intensify this game-playing; these
various manifestations can be utilized to express political ideas in additional unique ways and
have implications for both textual and visual cultures, including contributing to group cohesion
and identity formation.
My foremost argument is that football fans on polarized sides of the political
spectrum rely on these cultural objects and collective actions to “game-play” with
Germany’s mainstream restrictions and express their fringe views. Overlooking this idea
closes doors for a valuable exploration of ideologically-based subcultures that have international
influence and reveal unorthodox political aspirations of a portion of the population. From blank
canvas to finished and displayed product, this thesis seeks to analyze the cultural objects and
collective actions of fans—which I will occasionally refer to as cultural expressions—especially
from the aforementioned teams to understand several key ideas:
● What are the political, cultural, and legal impacts of football fans’ fringe rhetoric being
displayed through cultural objects and collective actions, rather than through speaking?
And what unique opportunities and modalities of expression does fan culture offer?
● What are the common and differing qualities between far-left fans’ and far-right fans’
cultural expressions? How do these qualities affect the functions of their objects?
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● What are the overall political, cultural, and legal implications of football fans’ fringe
rhetoric in a country like Germany, in which two dictatorships occurred less than 100
years ago?
● What role do legal, sport, and social restrictions play in shaping fans’ left-wing and
right-wing expressions?
Similar to St. Pauli, right outside of Berlin and set in the “Film City” (Filmstadt), fans of
the smaller football club in Brandenburg, Germany Babelsberg 03 also tend to be quite left-wing,
and some say, even further left than St. Pauli. Other East German teams, including FC Energie
Cottbus, Chemnitzer FC, and Lokomotiv Leipzig are known for having far-right fans, “but
Babelsberg 03 took a different path.”4 For example, Babelsberg’s stadium—covered in antifascist
graffiti—still has its communist-era stadium name.5 Founded as a “spin-off” of the former East
German Betriebssportgemeinschaft SV Motor Babelsberg, the team plays at Karl Liebknecht
Stadium, named after the co-founder of the Spartakus League and the German Communist Party.
Fans often feature Marxist imagery on their flags, banners, and stickers, and at games, antifascist
(antifa) flags are not difficult to spot.
Babelsberg 03 fans—strong rivals of fans of the team Chemnitzer FC—6continue to
position themselves as an antithesis to the far-right football fans in former East Germany. For
example, when anti-refugee banners sprouted around in the East, “Babelsberg instead gave free
entry to refugees.”7 In his blog on the “undervalued stories'” of football entitled No Football
Colours, content creator T.O Metz encapsulates the alternative left-wing culture of 03 fans in a
November 4th, 2015 post: “The Marxist nature of the club can be found anywhere; ranging from
4

James Montague, 1312: Among the Ultras (United Kingdom: Ebury Press, 2020), 223.
Montague, 1312, 223-224.
6
Montague, 1312, 223.
7
Montague, 1312, 224.
5
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free entrance for refugees, political flyers, merchandise, anti-fascist graffiti pieces, pre-match
music and how the fans dress.” Metz’s quote both highlights how left Babelsberg 03’s fan base
is, and how these fans rely on a performative style—which encompasses specific aesthetics and
specific sounds—to express their political stances.
Babelsberg’s fan base is so far-left that simply being a 03 fan—similar to being a St.
Pauli fan—can result in issues with the far-right: “[Babelsberg 03 fans] tend to become enemy #1
of any right-wing ultras groups in Berlin or the surrounding area,” a Reddit user says in a forum
about German football.8 Along with their performative style, some of Babelsberg’s notable
progressive actions include creating a team for refugees—Welcome 03—and their initiative
“Nazis Out of the Stadium” (Nazis Raus aus den Stadien) to oppose right-wing agitations in
stadiums. Eight football teams in Germany have signed onto the initiative, including St. Pauli
and Borussia Dortmund.9
Similarly, Borussia Dortmund—or BVB—is a team based in Dortmund, North Rhine
Westphalia with a left-wing fan base that formed as a response to neo-Nazi fans within the club.
This again highlights that some left-wing movements in German football are functioning as a
response to the far-right actions among other fans of the sport. But Borussia stands out from St.
Pauli and Babelsberg because it is in the Bundesliga, the top level of German football, with
hundreds of thousands of viewers worldwide. Although the club is somewhat less explicit in its
official support of left-wing actions than the other teams of interest, fans of Borussia run various
progressive projects, including one that educates fans about anti-semitism through visiting
8

@trenzafeeds. “r/Zweiteliga - Political Leanings of Football Clubs in Berlin (Hertha, Dynamo, Union Etc.),”
Reddit, accessed August 22, 2020,
https://www.reddit.com/r/zweiteliga/comments/cuda2e/political_leanings_of_football_clubs_in_berlin/.
9
Stephan Uersfeld, “Babelsberg's battle against far-right in Germany's fourth-tier gaining momentum,” ESPN, last
modified April 6, 2018,
https://www.espn.com/football/german-bundesliga/10/blog/post/3412795/babelsbergs-battle-against-far-right-in-ger
manys-fourth-tier-gaining-momentum.
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concentration camps.10 Dortmund fans’ orientation also highlights the association of fans’ actions
to local politics; football clubs and cities tend to be strongly intertwined as it is, but
politically-based football fans can also work to disrupt the political culture of the city they reside
in. For example, Borussia Dortmund is located in a more far-right area of Germany, meaning that
Borussia’s fans’ left-wing support is even more disruptive to far-right actions in the area, as
journalist Felix Tamsut notes in a March 18th, 2019 CNN piece:
In terms of the city, in terms of the region, in terms of the history, in terms of the voting
pattern, people are more prone to voting for far-right parties. I'm not talking in massive
percentages, but still more prone than in the big cities, and that's the reality in which
Borussia Dortmund exists. That's what makes their social work with young people even
more important. Within that reality, Dortmund stands against racism, against
discrimination, particularly against anti-Semitism, against homophobia, against sexism,
and it makes its mark.
Tasmut’s quote underscores how fans can represent political patterns of the location they
are based in, or how they can unite as a response to these patterns.
Overall, FC St. Pauli, SV Babelsberg 03, and Borussia Dortmund fans make clear
statements regarding their commitment to progressive socio-political action. While the teams and
their officials tend to also support these actions, the primary interest of this thesis is in the fans
and their actions, which can sometimes be at odds with their teams. These progressive fans will
be defined as far-left fans.
Those on the left of the left-right political spectrum favor “freedom, equality, fraternity,
rights, progress, reform and internationalism,”11 with socio-economic rights being at the core of

10
11

Uersfeld, “Babelsberg's battle.”
Andrew Heywood, Political Theory: an Introduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 119.
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the far-left.12 Examples of larger scale groups on the far-left include the Red Army Faction, the
Democratic Socialists of America, and Germany’s Die Linke party. 13 On the other hand, the
far-right involves “attitudes, scenes, groups, and political parties that espouse some combination
of xenophobic, antidemocratic, authoritarian, anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, anti-government,
fascist, homophobic, ethnonationalist, or racist values, beliefs actions, and goals.”14 The right
typically emphasizes “authority, hierarchy, order, duty, tradition, reaction and nationalism.”15
Examples of larger scale groups on the far-right include France’s Identity Bloc and Germany’s
Alternative for Germany party (AfD). This thesis will define football fans who espouse these
values as far-right fans.
However, labeling one or a group as simply far-left or simply far-right is not so simple:
these fans do not act as a monolith, and it is vital to note that scholars disagree on what the
far-left and far-right exactly are. For example, sometimes far-right groups can be referred to as
“hate groups,” but they might see those on the other side as haters.16 Furthermore, actions that
one performs do not always reflect their inner beliefs, thoughts, and attitudes. But while inner
processes are important, this thesis is more concerned with public performance: that is, even if
one does not understand or support antisemitic views on the inside, if they are doing a Hitler
salute, they will be viewed as a “far-right fan.” As one will also see, it is not always justifiable to
call a fan base or team just far-left or far-right: fans of the same football teams can be far-left and
far-right. It is important to acknowledge this mix, but also to acknowledge that certain teams
have a reputation for having an overall far-left or far-right fan base.

12

Luke March & Cas Mudde, “What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and
Mutation,” Comp Eur Polit 3, 23–49 (Spring 2005): 23-49, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110052.
13
There is some argument over whether Die Linke is left-wing or actually far-left.
14
Miller-Idriss, The Extreme Gone Mainstream, 18.
15
Heywood, Political Theory: an Introduction, 119.
16
Miller-Idriss, The Extreme Gone Mainstream, 18.

Garner 11

The first team with a notable far-right fan base that will be explored is Chemnitzer FC.
Fans of this team based in Chemnitz, Saxony have made headlines numerous times for racist,
xenophobic, and antisemitic actions. Fans of this team also demonstrate the different degrees of
transparency that politically-based football fans use. The team, for example, does not officially
support right-wing actions; however, there have been instances of the club not condemning fans’
right-wing actions.
For instance, at a 2019 football game, Chemnitzer fans caused outrage when the team
allowed supporters to memorialize fellow fan and far-right activist Thomas (Tommy)
Haller—who had recently passed away—by holding up two large banners, with one banner
displaying a cross and with one reading “Rest in peace, Tommy.”17 In the 1990s Haller
co-founded the far-right hooligan (football fan) group “Hooligans, Nazis, Racists”18 (HooNaRa),
which was one of the first hooligan groups to show that they could organize and
“professionalise.”19 Haller's security company also originally provided security for Chemnitzer
FC, but after Haller gave an interview in 2007 admitting to starting HooNaRa, the official story
is that Chemnitzer FC cut off their relationship with his security company. In reality, Haller’s
employees continued to do security for Chemnitzer FC, but as subcontractors.20 Overall, Haller
had deep and extended connections to the club.
Chemnitzer club officials defended the fans who displayed the banner by stating, “it was
a matter of human sympathy to allow the club's fans and the bereaved to mourn together.”21 In
addition to this defense, Chemnitzer FC also originally approved the fans’ banner to memorialize
17

Felix Tamsut, “Why Was a Neo-Nazi Hooligan Mourned at a Football Game in Germany?” Deutsche Welle, last
modified March 13, 2019,
https://www.dw.com/en/why-was-a-neo-nazi-hooligan-mourned-at-a-football-game-in-germany/a-47856332.
18
Tamsut, “Why Was a Neo-Nazi Hooligan Mourned at a Football Game in Germany?”
19
Montague, 1312, 223.
20
Montague, 1312, 223.
21
“Neo-Nazi hooligan mourned at Chemnitz football match,” Deutsche Welle, last modified March 10, 2019,
https://www.dw.com/en/neo-nazi-hooligan-mourned-at-chemnitz-football-match/a-47845091.
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Haller. After the story broke about Chemnitzer fans honoring neo-Nazi Thomas Haller, the CEO
of the club, and a local Chemnitz SPD politician and fan-liaison, “who had written a Facebook
post praising Haller,” resigned, Chemnitzer FC's main sponsor severed its relationship, and the
club was fined 12,000 euros by the regional football association.22
Football clubs and cities tend to be strongly intertwined, with the club representing the
city and the city often supporting the club. Namely, the majority of a team’s supporters come
from that city, represent the city at away games,23 and the city, in turn, supports their club.
However, Chemnitz city officials openly wanted to distance themselves from the actions of the
team and its fans regarding these banners. Officials released a statement reading “Chemnitz is an
open-minded, tolerant and peaceful city. We distance ourselves emphatically from all racist and
right-wing actions and statements.”24 The officials’ statement shows how fans’ actions can affect
formal support from the city.25
Other notable far-right actions from Chemnitzer FC fans include fans chanting
antisemitic tropes at games, fans calling the club's sporting director Thomas Sobotzik a “Jewish
pig,” and fans chanting “at least Daniel Frahn is not a negro,” referring to the former club captain
who openly supported a far-right hooligan group.26 Even if the club condemns the actions of
some players and fans, and even if not all fans are right-wing, Chemnitzer FC has overall
garnered a reputation of being “neo-Nazis.”

22

Montague, 1312, 226.
In addition to politics. That is, football fans make up a portion of the voting population in an area, officially
representing the area in facts and figures regarding its political makeup.
24
“Neo-Nazi hooligan mourned.”
25
Or support from the “mainstream.”
26
Benjamin Salmon, “German Football Team Threatens Legal Action against Own Fans after Antisemitic Chants,”
The JC, last modified August 27, 2019,
https://www.thejc.com/news/world/german-chemnitzer-football-team-threatens-legal-action-against-own-fans-afterantisemitic-chants-1.487898.
23
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In addition to officials occasionally stating their disdain for this far-right behavior, the
club itself has also condemned some right-wing actions of both its fans and players at times. For
example, club officials fined and condemned player Daniel Frahn when when he held up a shirt
commonly worn by the neo-Nazi hooligan scene during a post-goal celebration, despite Frahn
claiming he did not know that the shirt was commonly worn by neo-Nazis.27 This shows that a
football club and its fans do not always explicitly match in political stances, but at the same time,
clubs might turn a blind eye or support their fans’ far-right politically-oriented actions.
Furthermore, this demonstrates the inconsistency of officials. Chemnitzer FC officials both
displayed sympathy for fans publicly mourning
neo-Nazi Tommy Haller and fined Frahn for
holding up a shirt commonly worn by those in the
neo-Nazi hooligan scene.
Similar to Chemnitzer FC, FC Energie Cottbus
based in Cottbus, Brandenburg also has a fan base
with a reputation of being far-right. Chemnitzer
and Energie fans even share a friendship, and when
Haller died, Energie fans mourned with Chemnitzer
fans, also with an approved banner. When referring
to how several clubs across Germany mourned Haller’s death, researcher and author Robert
Claus—who has a background in the intersection of far-right extremism and football—said “it's a
pan-European network of far-right groups,” showing that a far-right, cooperating fan subculture
is beyond a single team.28 Many of the “forbidden” groups across this far-right fan network are
27

“Neo-Nazi hooligan mourned at Chemnitz football match.”
Tamsut, “Why Was a Neo-Nazi Hooligan Mourned at a Football Game in Germany?”; Although the
politically-oriented subcultures of these teams can respectively have their own unique features.
28
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still operating. Kaotic Chemnitz, for example, is a “thinly veiled rebrand of HooNaRa.”29
Similarly, Inferno Cottbus 1999 was believed to be dissolved, but the group is still operating,30
showing that well-known far-right fan groups are still operating despite regulations against
far-right extremism. According to Claus, a “dissolution” might be portrayed, rather than actually
done, to avoid prosecution.31 Other right-wing actions of Cottbus fans include the fans chanting
anti-Roma chants and fans wearing Klu Klux Klan (KKK) hoods when celebrating their team
being promoted.
Cottbus fans’ far-right stances mean that games against teams with far-left fans can
result in turmoil. A 2017 game between Cottbus and Babelsberg resulted in an
internationally-publicized and politically-fueled clash between the teams when Cottbus fans
made Nazi salutes and chanted “work makes you free, Babelsberg 03” (Arbeit macht frei,
Babelsberg null drei)—referring to the inscription written above several concentration camps in
Nazi Germany, “WORK MAKES YOU FREE” (ARBEIT MACHT FREI)—and in response,
Babelsberg chanted “Nazi pigs out!“ (Nazischweine raus!).32 The original result of the
confrontation was a fine of over 7,000 Euros for only Babelsberg because of their use of
pyrotechnics and contributions to the crowd trouble.33 Refusing to pay the fine, Babelsberg
garnered the support of various football clubs—including Borussia Dortmund—for their “Nazis

29

Montague, 1312, 222.
Davis VanOpdorp, “Energie Cottbus, Bayern Munich’s DFB-Pokal opponent, and their trials with right-wing
extremism,” SB Nation, last modified August 11, 2019,
https://www.bavarianfootballworks.com/2019/8/11/20800693/energie-cottbus-bayern-munich-german-cup-dfb-pokal
-right-wing-extremism-babelsberg-brandenburg.
31
VanOpdorp, “Energie Cottbus, Bayern Munich’s DFB-Pokal opponent, and their trials with right-wing
extremism.”
32
Matt Ford, “Lower League Club Resists Fan Misconduct Fine, Blaming Neo-Nazi Visiting Fans,” Deutsche Well,
last modified February 2, 2018,
https://www.dw.com/en/lower-league-club-resists-fan-misconduct-fine-blaming-neo-nazi-visiting-fans/a-42430846.
33
Ford, “Lower League Club Resists Fan Misconduct Fine, Blaming Neo-Nazi Visiting Fans.”
30
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Out of Stadiums” (Nazis Raus aus den Stadien) initiative.34 This instance underscores the
potential for collision between fans on polarized sides of the political spectrum.
But when looking at Energie Cottbus fans overall, one can see that the team’s fan base is
not completely far-right: there is also a right-wing versus left-wing struggle within the fan base.
This became salient when some Cottbus fans decided to address the reputation of their team
around 2017 by pasting stickers reading “Energy fans against Nazis!” (Energiefans gegen Nazis!)
and “Energy fans against racism!” (Energiefans gegen Rassismus!) around the community and
by displaying banners with antifascist messages.35 These actions have not always gone over
smoothly within the Cottbus fan base. According to the Facebook group “FC Energie Cottbus Fans Against Nazis” (FC Energie Cottbus - Fans gegen Nazis), their anti-Nazi banner was stolen
at least twice by neo-Nazis.36 This intra-club struggle within Energie Cottbus highlights the fact
that fans of a team whose fan-base has a largely—or at least saliently—far-left or far-right fan
base does not mean that all fans of that team have the same stance. Cottbus fans’ struggles also
show that the politically-oriented actions of a fan group are a collective effort; that is, left-wing
Cottbus fans creating and distributing the Energiefans against Racism! stickers and right-wing
Cottbus fans chanting neo-Nazi chants required collaboration and coordination between a
number of fans. This teamwork and common perception of politically-based fans as a unit—in
addition to other traits—means that one should look at these dedicated politically-oriented fans
as a subculture.

34

Uersfeld, “Babelsberg's Battle against Far-Right in Germany's Fourth-Tier Gaining Momentum.”
Vanja Budde and Sylvia Belka-Lorenz, “Rechtsextremismus in Cottbus - ‘Eine Der Bestorganisierten
Neonazi-Szenen Im Osten,’” Deutschlandfunk Kultur, last modified March 7, 2019,
https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/rechtsextremismus-in-cottbus-eine-der-bestorganisierten.1001.de.html?dram
%3Aarticle_id=442913.
36
FC Energie Cottbus - Fans gegen Nazis, Facebook, May 28, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/EnergiefansggNzs/.
35
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An “Energiefans gegen Rassismus!” (Energiefans Against Rassismus!) sticker is pasted on a pole above a “FCK
NZS” (fuck Nazis) sticker.37

The fan bases of FC St. Pauli, SV Babelsberg 03, FC Energie Cottbus, Chemnitzer FC,
and Borussia Dortmund stand out in international football. While these teams are arguably
unique, it is also vital to note here that these are just a few teams with politically-oriented fan
bases in Germany. Other German teams such as BFC Türkiyemspor 1978, 1.FSV Mainz 05 II,
and Lokomotiv Leipzig are also known for having politically-oriented fan-bases. German
37

FC Energie Cottbus - Fans gegen Nazis.
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football is overall known for having these types of (vocally) politically-oriented fan bases. After
all, “any given month saw hundreds of protests in German football stadiums,”38 causing
Germany to garner a reputation for having a notable mix of politics and sport at their football
games.
It is clear that politically-oriented fans across Germany rely on an array of cultural
objects and collective actions to get their politically-oriented messages across. From
“Energiefans Against Nazis!” stickers to large “REFUGEES ARE WELCOME HERE” banners
and “Support your local hools” t-shirts, football fans are disrupting both sport and society with
their detachment from the politically moderate mainstream on multiple levels with a
“DIY-subculture,”39 channeled through banners, posters, stickers, clothing, chants, and songs.
Fans expressing “extreme” ideas in creative ways means that these ideas can influence the
political culture in Germany and beyond both metaphorically and literally. Metaphorically,
far-left and far-right fans' expressions offer alternatives to the mainstream, uniquely “disrupting”
the conventional options. One can also see a literal interruption: fans’ chants, for example, are
actually “interrupting” what could be apolitical football games. As one can see, fans’ fringe
rhetoric on both the left and right continues to take advantage of the unique qualities football
provides—such as high publicity—and play with the limitations and freedoms imposed by
Germany’s laws, policies, and social taboos.
In the remainder of this introduction, an overview of German politics, resistant
subcultures, psychological phenomena at play, football as a means of expression and
mobilization, social taboos, and law and policies in Germany that are necessary for
understanding the relationship between the contemporary politically-oriented football culture and
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the German establishment will be explored. First, it is important to understand how far-left and
far-right football fan bases pose a unique relationship to Germany’s tumultuous history with
fascism that was responsible for the death of almost 20 million people in Europe and the
communist dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic that continues to affect the society
of the former East today.
Politics and Resistant Subcultures in Germany
What is considered far-right and far-left can vary between countries depending on their
historical, legal,40 and cultural backgrounds. Throughout Germany’s history, political extremism
has given rise to nonconformist, anti-establishment subcultures with ties to both ends of the
political spectrum seeking to interrupt what they perceived as oppressive mainstream societies.
These nonconformist subcultures perform(ed) their interrupting expressions via the utilization of
cultural objects and collective actions. To understand the politically-oriented football fans of
today’s Germany as a resistant subculture, it is vital to first look at Germany’s history of
rebellious subcultures, specifically the ones that blossomed during two German dictatorships in
the 20th century.
From 1933-1945, Germany was ruled under the fascist dictatorship of Adolf Hitler and
the followers of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, or Nazi Party (NSDAP). The
Nazis’ ideologies were strongly based in an idea of “purity,” which was the basis for their desire
to kill or oppress those they found through a pseudoscience called eugenics—or “race
science”—to be “genetic blemishes” to their idealized, ethnically homogenous Aryan society. 41
Those killed by the Nazis included Jews, Roma, Sinti, disabled people, and those who supported
Communism, among others. Also tied to the idea of “purity,” racism and antisemitism were
40
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strong themes in Nazi ideology, along with nationalism, disinformation, xenophobia,
anti-capitalism, and anti-Marxism. The Nazis conducted extensive and violent means to
accomplish their goals, including pogroms, law and policy changes restricting human rights,
medical experimentation, annexing other countries through land expansion (Lebensraum), and a
genocide aimed at the aforementioned groups of people.
Germany’s right-wing extremist history has had a strong impact on today’s German
society, resulting in a wide range of questions regarding how to navigate the country post-Hitler,
while coming to terms with Germany’s Nazi past. Vergangenheitsbewältigung—the term
referring to Germany’s coping with its past—serves as an example of the ever-present effects of
Nazi Germany on German society. The main questions that Germans confronting the past seek to
answer are how could an atrocity like the Holocaust occur? and what does the German past
mean for the German future? And to confront these questions, Germans have had anything but a
homogenous solution.
The word Vergangenheitsbewältigung illustrates issues the country is having in dealing
with its past. While Vergangenheitsbewältigung is a commonly used term to refer to how
Germany is addressing its past, one can also see the promotion of the word
Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung rather than Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Bewältigung—which refers
to “overcoming”—is criticized for referring to finally overcoming the past. On the other hand,
aufarbeitung—which refers to “working through”—implies the idea of “working up from the
past,” or that Germany’s history of National Socialism is something that the country has to
continuously work through, rather than be finished with.42 “Bewältigung” is additionally
criticized for sounding closed and bureaucratic and for having a linguistic similarity to the
German word for violence (Gewalt). This thesis will utilize both Vergangenheitsbewältigung
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(“overcoming”) and Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung (“working through”), while acknowledging that
Vergangenheitsbewältigung is highly common in the literature and debates and is sometimes
used interchangeably with Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung.43
In Germany, Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung and Vergangenheitsbewältigung are a broad
effort on various levels. Well-known examples of working through or overcoming the past
include the Nuremberg Trials—during which some Nazis were prosecuted—erecting monuments
to memoralize Holocaust victims, and implementing stronger restrictions on hate speech. On the
other hand, coping with the past can also mean promoting the idea that Germans should not
continue to hold guilt for the Holocaust because of the similarities of the Holocaust to other
genocides, reflecting the view of the more conservative participants of the Historian’s Debate
(Historikerstreit) of the late 1980s. One can especially see Vergangenheitsbewältigung here
because through this view, after the Holocaust is addressed, Germans are done with dealing with
it. This illustrates that addressing Germany’s history of human rights violations is not a
monolithic nor agreed upon effort. These words can also be viewed in relation to strong social
taboos in Germany; Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung has made it so that it is often
highly frowned upon to commit acts that reflect nationalism or various forms of discrimination.
Nationalistic and discriminatory rhetoric continue to have more intimate effects in the
country, illustrating how Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung, or dealing with/working
through the past, means a present-tense dealing with/working for the present and future. Despite
an effort to suppress right-wing extremism in the country as a result of
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung, it has continued to persist after Nazi rule through a
spectrum of right-wing extremism, ranging from “subculture-oriented right-wing extremists”—
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including within the right-wing football fan subculture—to right-wing extremist parties that are
not allowed to receive federal funding because they are deemed unconstitutional
(verfassungsfeindlich), like the Nationalist Party of Germany (NPD).44 This illustrates the
necessity of addressing right-wing extremism in present-day Germany; it still persists decades
after the Third Reich.
Today, right-wing extremism can be present in almost any facet of German life, from
school to sport.45 This right-wing extremism is often also accompanied by
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung-type response. For example, in the football stadium,
one can see fans doing Hitler salutes, but one can also see examples of
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung through Dortmund fans holding up a large banner
reading “WESTFALENSTADION—NO STAGE FOR NAZIS”
(WESTFALENSTADION—KEINE BÜHNE FÜR NAZIS).46 In Germany, one can see how from
inside the stadium to beyond, Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung through different
domains and actions such as memorializing, teaching, and adjusting illustrates the fact of
political tumult in Germany and its dark shadow remaining over the German government and
people.
Nazi Germany, however, does not paint the entire picture of Germany’s past of
dictatorships that have had lasting effects on contemporary German society.
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung have also been used to refer to dealing with the
communist dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) during Germany’s
post-World War II division—a dictatorship which resulted in opposition subcultures that provide
44
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an insight to opposition groups as a whole and the persistence of far-left and far-right subcultures
in Germany.
One of these subcultures was the formation of an anti-establishment punk scene in the
former East in the 1980s, which started as a music scene and became more political after the
punks faced oppression from both the Stasi—the GDR’s secret police agency—and those on the
right—like skinheads—for their alternative style, music taste, and objection of the system.47 Not
all punks were necessarily left-wing, but many punks and the bands they followed—such as the
band Chaos Z—did express left-wing extremist views ranging from pro-anarchy, anti-capitalism,
and also like right-wing oriented subcultures, distrust of the mainstream. Although a punk scene
did exist in the west, the GDR punks’ centralized and unified approach to radical and
confrontational resistance made them a structurally different resistance group.48 Thus, far-left
culture in the GDR was especially cultivated and focused on anti-establishment ideas and
anti-other oppositional elements. Namely, the Eastern punks united around a simple, but unified
message of bringing down the system of their country by rebelling through both organization and
style.49
Clad in leather jackets, mohawks, and pins with anti-establishment slogans, punks
opposed the system with both their lifestyle and appearance.50 It was precisely this fringe,
nonconformist style through cultural objects and collective actions that worried the East German
government. But the punks’ style actually made it easier for the Stasi and the K1—or the
Criminal Police’s (Kriminalpolizei) political division—to identify the punks and regularly call
47
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them in for interrogation, make them sign documents identifying themselves as criminal
elements, arrest them, limit the punks’ travels, and beat them.51 Even if a punk was not
necessarily caught doing anything, their style could put them at risk. The implications of this
dissentient style meant that it was the goal of the K1 to eliminate the punks from public view, but
the fact that these nonconformist styles continued even after oppression from the Stasi illustrates
how the punks wanted to be seen as a threat to the system. Furthermore, this alternative
subculture in East Germany was not an insignificant interruption to GDR society; in fact, an East
German government report in 1989 found the punks to be a top problem for the country.52

51

Mohr, Burning Down the Haus, 24.
Andrew Flanagan, “Punks, Up Against The Wall,” NPR, last modified September 29, 2018.
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/29/652567677/punks-up-against-the-wall.
52

Garner 24

A Stasi surveillance photo of an East German punk named “Speiche.” East German police dragged Speiche from a
tram, beat him, shaved off his mohawk, and spread the idea that Speiche worked for them.53

Like the East, the West also had a developing punk subculture, which was less secretive
than its Eastern counterpart. For example, a “German punk” (Deutschpunk) music style
developed in West Germany in the 1980s, featuring more public music with left-wing lyrics. To
look at a specific example of punk in the West, a non-conformist “punk ideology” along with
53
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alternative styles spread through the West German St. Pauli district in the 1980s. When political
and economic insecurity hit Germany and right-wing hooligans began to attack houses around St.
Pauli’s stadium, a punk and left-wing response arose from FC St. Pauli fans.54 Punks that also
emigrated or were deported to the West from the East became involved in the anarcho-punk
circles in the West, still maintaining their contacts with the punks in the East. Overall, rebellious
punk cultures developed in both the East and West in different contexts and with different
implications.
One can also see the specific persistence of a punk-oriented culture and punk
appreciation within the politically-oriented German football fan cultures, showing the
relationship between these non-conformist subcultures in German football to other historically
non-conformist subcultures. For example, the shirt below is a shirt that Babelsberg 03 sells in
their fan shop (Fanladen) that says “ALWAYS PUNK” (FÜR IMMER PUNK), with a rough,
seemingly disorderly design, emulating the original style of the punks in the 1980s. What is
interesting to note is that Babelsberg 03 is an East German football team, mirroring the continued
influence of (Eastern) punk in the former East even to today.
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A shirt sold through Babelsberg’s fanshop says “ALWAYS PUNK” (FÜR IMMER PUNK).

On the other hand, a far-right subculture was also developing in the GDR, despite the
government of the former East being against the far-right in a de jure sense. Perhaps this is
because—as political scientist Gideon Botsch argues—East Germany had innate and “substantial
extremist-rightist elements,” which matched with the regime’s “authoritarianism, orderliness, and
‘range of secondary virtues,’” which can be observed as common features to right-wing
dictatorships. Botsch also cites common outbreaks of xenophobia and racism against non-GDR
citizens and foreigners within the GDR.55 Perhaps because of this environment cultivated by the
55
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GDR, another subculture that developed in the GDR was the skinhead subculture, members of
which were often far-right.
Like the radical punks, the skinheads—originally not political, but with some becoming
more right-wing and nationalist—were also a threat to the order and ideologies of the GDR’s
socialist dictatorship. Part of the reason that a left-wing, radical punk scene gained traction in the
GDR was actually because of the East German authorities overlooking or even secretly
supporting the skinheads.56 The irony of the lack of a clear plan for targeting right-wing
extremism in the GDR also made some point out the contradictions in the “left-wing” system, as
authorities refused to acknowledge the existence of extreme-right views.57 It is still vital to
acknowledge that the government of the GDR—although lacking a clear plan of attack—did help
prevent the right-wing extremists in the former East developing into a larger-scale movement to
an extent. For example, the East German government destroyed right-wing propaganda material
and forbade the existence of right-wing parties through its Political Parties Act. 58 Therefore, both
left-wing and right-wing subcultures in the GDR were in opposition to and monitored by the East
German government; these subcultures' opposition to the mainstream in the former East also
meant that the subcultures continued to operate as fringe networks.
The GDR also saw the importance of sport when it came to both radicalization and
(re-)integration of extremists, highlighting the intersection of sport and political culture. When it
came to right-wing extremism, the GDR often stuck to their regular “three-pronged reaction” of
“de-politicisation, repression, and integration” by targeting the sport and leisure activities of the
groups like the skinheads.59 Organizations such as the GDR’s Sports and Technology Association
56
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(Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik) were called on to support the social integration of skinheads
through initiatives such as football-based measures.
This is partly because football specifically provided a ripe environment for right-wing
radicalization in the former East and its connections were and remain with the neo-Nazi and/or
skinhead scene. For example, some members of the Lichtenberg-Front—a well-documented
far-right group founded in 1986—came from the fan group for Berliner Fussball Club Dynamo e.
V., and the Vandals were a group referred to as a supra-regional far-right group whose members
largely consisted of disorderly supporters of a Berlin football club.60 Similarly, Botsch cites a
turning point in the politicization of the skinhead scene in the former East in 1987 at a rock
concert at East Berlin’s Zion Church commonly attended by “opposition elements” like left-wing
punks, when about 30 skinheads and Berliner FC Fans attacked the church and left-wing punks,
garnering more mainstream attention.61 Right-wing chants were also present among East German
football fans in the 1980s. For example, in 1986, far-right Nationalistic Front members—from
West Berlin—reported hearing nationalistic chanting and singing by local fans at a game in East
Berlin.62 These instances underscore the fact that extremist politics and German football have
been mixed for at least decades.
In 1990, East and West Germany reunified, and during this transition, right-wing
extremism in the now (re)unified Germany grew. The transition through unification—or the
Turning Point (die Wende)63—gave power to the neo-Nazis scenes in both West and East
Germany because under new leadership, a pro-Nazi youth subculture of skinheads, hooligans,
and “faschos” especially from the (now) former East Germany began to develop into a
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politically-oriented “national opposition.”64 Reunification was crucial to this formation of a
national opposition because it allowed for more cooperation between far-right extremists of each
Germany. For example, right-wing extremists from the former West and former East could
borrow new chants and ideas from one another. Furthermore, part of the far-right in the former
West brought mass propaganda into the former East, which was enthusiastically welcomed by
some.65 During the Wende, these right-wing extremist ideas already growing in the former East,
became a united, nationalistic opposition that echoed tones of Nazi Germany.66
One of the explanations for more prominent far-right extremism in the former East is the
area’s identity crisis and issues during and after reunification, which made it a more fertile
ground for right-wing extremism. During the 1990s, East Germany was going through massive
changes after the metaphorical and literal “fall of the wall” separating the West and East,
including losing a significant amount of the workforce due to internal migration to the West,
quickly adjusting to international competition, experiencing decreased social welfare protection
and capitalistic endeavors—like shopping malls—along with overall adjusting to a new political
and economic system.67 A right-wing movement continued to develop in former East Germany
as immigrants were used as a scapegoat for former East's struggles during this transition.68
Again, this growth of the far-right, neo-Nazi scene in the latter half of the twentieth
century also had implications in the football arena. When about 100 violent right-wing extremists
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were freed at the end of 1989, far-right attacks and vandalism followed, including on Jewish
cemeteries and projects and housing perceived as leftist.69 After almost every weekly football
match, fans led by neo-Nazis would go to squatted houses, where they would train and spread
ideologies with international visitors, showing football as a gathering ground for the far-right.70
During the continued political extremism throughout the Wende, cultural objects acted as
representations of a respective side of the political spectrum. For example, during this time
period, extreme-right marching squads began to show up at weekly Monday night
demonstrations in Leipzig, each squad with its own flag—including a nationalistic display of the
German flag—banners, and member groups, similar to the fan squads of certain football teams.71
In opposition, antagonistic and young left-wing punks showed up to the far-right demonstrations
to fight back.72 As it often was a response to the far-right, the growth of the neo-Nazi scene
helped the left-wing punk culture gain traction. For example, the new wave of neo-Nazism in the
1980s actually contributed to punk bands from the 1980s reuniting and releasing new music
about the dangers of neo-Nazism. These examples accentuate the use of cultural objects—like
banners and songs—as representation articles for politically fringe individuals, functioning
throughout history as ways for them to communicate with each other on the fringe sides of the
spectrum.
Today, political extremism in the former East on both sides of the spectrum remains
higher than in the former West. This is especially true for far-right extremism, including far-right
extremist violence. East Germans can often easily call to mind the weeks of racist riots in
Hoyersweda, Saxony in 1991, during which asylum seekers and temporary workers were
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targeted.73 Following Hoyersweda, one can also see a pattern of neo-Nazi strongholds in the
former East; East German cities like Jena, the location of the National Socialist Underground
(NSU), and Chemnitz, where some principle NSU members fled to, became and continue to
remain neo-Nazi strongholds with a “flourishing” far-right scene.74 Other towns with strong
neo-Nazi presences in the former East include Leipzig, Dresden, Bautzen, Brandenburg, Saxony,
and Saxon-Anhalt in which neo-nazi marches, attacks on refugee housings, and hate crimes
towards individuals and groups have occured.75
Although attacks occurring from fringe, politically extreme networks might seem
completely divorced from federal-level politics, some voting results in Germany also reflect
far-left and far-right political cultures. The establishment, therefore, is not necessarily the federal
government as a whole—or any upper-level entity—but more the status quo, the centrists, or the
accepted. Starting on the far-left, Die Linke is Germany's far-left populist socialist party that
seeks to implement progressive legislation. For example, in their 2013 campaign, Die Linke
focused on reforming the “discriminatory” Hartz IV laws, which cut benefits for the
unemployed.76 The 2013 campaign also focused on expanding educational opportunities for
youth and specifically took advantage of its higher popularity in the former East with signs
stating “East votes red. Understand?”77 Overall, Die Linke seeks to promote progressive, and
anti-capitalist legislation under the umbrella of left-wing ideological beliefs.
73
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The success of the Die Linke is particularly interesting because far-left powers often
remain absent in many formerly communist Eastern European countries.78 However, perhaps Die
Linke’s success in the former East is because the former East had a communist dictatorship,
while Die Linke and its predecessors have promoted democratic socialism. This means that those
in the former East can vote for a far-left party lacking the element of authoritarianism that
contributed to German Democratic Republic’s downfall. But to some, Die Linke’s political
position is still taboo. For instance, some more centrist politicians and parties within the German
government will try to exclude Die Linke by painting it as anti-democratic, totalitarian,
communist, and Trotskyist/Stalinist, among other anti-democratic labels.79 Interestingly, these
strategies may decrease the far-left influence, but not necessarily the far-left vote: German left
parties have hit historic highs while being politically excluded from federal activities.80 However,
while far-left politics and ideologies persist in Germany on various levels, right-wing extremism
seems to be what’s making headlines during more recent years. Despite
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung-related efforts especially focused on Holocaust
education and preventing right-wing extremism, right-wing extremism has persisted in different
forms in Germany.
One of the more pronounced results of persisting right-wing extremism in Germany is
right-wing extremist violence; while the bulk of the far-right extremist scene is opposed to
violence, right-wing extremism has an “explicit predilection for violence.”81 The Amadeu
Antonio Foundation monitors right-wing extremism in Germany and has attributed 208 deaths to
right-wing extremism since 1990, estimating that there are over 32,000 right-wing extremists in
78
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the country, and that over 1,000 of these right-wing extremists are primed for violence.82 With
underground far-right networks still in existence, ministers in Germany claim that far-right
extremism is Germany’s greatest security threat, and the data certainly makes it seem so. From
2016 to 2018, the number of far-right severely violent incidents in Germany per capita—usually
targeting people of color or immigrants—far passed the numbers of other European countries.83
Although seemingly obvious, it is important to consider that these far-right extremists
were not born far-right extremists. Radicalization can occur through where (future) extremists
can find community through groups like online communities, marches, schools, concerts, and
sports clubs, including amateur football and football fan scenes. Certain factors in conjunction
with the social aspect that football fan culture involves provides a basis for understanding how a
fan becomes a far-right fan.
One of the paramount factors that can contribute to political radicalization within a
country is instability, either perceived or actual. Miller-Idriss notes this by stating that the
“appeal of Nazism and fascism was rooted in the loss of stability in the global, postmodern
era.”84 The contemporary influx of migrants into Germany, for example, has created a feeling of
uncertainty for some Germans over whether the migrants would fit into German society or
attempt to change it, whether there would be less jobs for “native” Germans,85 and whether
migrants would perform antisocial acts within the country. Similarly, National Socialism grew
under post-World War I economic uncertainty, neo-Nazi violence and activities grew during the
Wende, and today, right-wing terrorism grew in UN member states during the pandemic.86 This
82

“Germany is belatedly waking up to the threat of far-right terrorism,” The Economist, last modified February 27,
2020,
https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/02/27/germany-is-belatedly-waking-up-to-the-threat-of-far-right-terrorism.
83
“Germany is belatedly waking up.”
84
Miller-Idriss, The Extreme Gone Mainstream, 21.
85
Who is a “native” German? “Native” German is often a euphemism for white German.
86
“MEMBER STATES CONCERNED BY THE GROWING AND INCREASINGLY TRANSNATIONAL
THREAT OF EXTREME RIGHT-WING TERRORISM,” United Nations Security Council, released July 2020,

Garner 34

instability goes hand-in-hand with fear, as political extremists can recruit by taking advantage of
peoples’ anxieties during large-scale, societal change. 87

Data from the Centre for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo shows that right-wing extremism in
Germany surpasses that of other European countries.88

Some recent examples of more recent violence from right-wing extremism in Germany
that have garnered international attention include the following:
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● Karamba Diaby, the only Black MP (Member of Parliament) in Germany, had his
office shot at and received death threats in emails, including with email sign offs
reading “hail to victory” (Sieg heil).89 Nazis said this chant or “Hail Hitler” (Heil
Hitler) frequently, often accompanying it by raising their right arm.90
● The Hanau shooting in 2020 involved a right-wing extremist killing 9 immigrants
and those from ethnic minorities in Hanau, Germany.91
● The Old School Society was a German right-wing society with evidence of
terrorist orientation in 2014. The group was originally a purely internet group that
developed into a radicalized cell, planning attacks on accommodations for asylum
seekers and mosques.92
● Walter Lübcke—a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) pro-refugee
politician—was murdered in his home by a right-wing extremist in June of
2019.93 Because of the prevalence and violence far-right extremism, some
politicians have continued to feel intimidated, with many wanting to quit.94
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An honor guard stands next to a portrait of the late CDU politician Walter Lübcke at his funeral. Lübcke was killed
by a right-wing extremist because of his pro-refugee views.95

Like the far-left, the far-right is not only confined to fringe, underground networks in
Germany; the prevalence of politically extreme subcultures is also reflected in the federal
government through the election of far-right politicians and parties post-NSDAP. Again, the
federal government reflects the existence of these political subcultures because it is partly the
people in the subcultures voting these far-right politicians in.
For example, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) is the farthest-right party
in Germany since the NSDAP. The several decades old far-right NPD has never passed the 5%
threshold in federal elections, but did find regional success in Germany’s states of Saxony and
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and was elected to these state parliaments between 2004 and 2009.96
Although there have been several attempts to ban the party and its “neo-Nazi agenda,” courts
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have determined that the party’s low success does not threaten democracy and does not,
therefore, constitute a ban.97
But another far-right party has actually seen considerable success in Germany. In recent
years, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD)—founded in 2013 foremost as an
anti-immigration party—has also gained traction, especially in the former East. The AfD’s
rhetoric has been stated to normalize extremist ideas, and the party has embraced the anti-Islam
Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) movement, which has
held many, sometimes weekly, protests in the former East.98 Despite taboos of the AfD’s
sometimes neo-Nazi-like actions because of Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung, the AfD
has gained massive success in recent years. As of 2020, it is the third largest party in the
Bundestag, Germany’s Federal Parliament.99
While this thesis is primarily concerned with Germany, it is vital to note how
interconnected Europe is, especially among the Member States of the European Union (EU).
Throughout Europe—including in in Denmark, France, Greece, Austria, and other
countries—far-right extremism in growing,100 perhaps as a result of increased immigration or
perceived increased immigration in various EU Member States. Ironically, much of EU Member
States “spent decades rebuilding democratic societies post-WWII,”101 reflecting their respective
own Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung-related efforts. Although the Nazi’s far-right
national populism was defeated in or by these countries in the twentieth century, and is often
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seen through Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung efforts as a movement associated with
perpetuating or avoiding atrocity, it is currently on the rise. This underscores that there is not a
clear division between politics and the activities of politically-involved or -oriented citizens.
Namely, the growth of far-right parties is correlated with a growth in far-right violence and other
far-right activities.
In Germany and in other European countries,102 the far-right often utilizes several main
tactics to gain traction. These tactics are based on what Benedikt Peters—politics editor at the
Süddeutsche Zeitung—postulates as reasons for the AfD’s contemporary rise in popularity.103
One of these tactics is fear. As aforementioned, instability is a paramount fact that contributes to
the growth of political extremism because it results in anxieties that the far-right takes advantage
of. One of the main fears that the German far-right expresses is a fear of refugees and what an
increase in refugees will mean for their society. The AfD’s more recent support is highly derived
from Germany’s 2015 refugee crisis, during which hundreds of thousands of refugees came to
Germany and several crimes committed by immigrants or refugees captured wide-scale
publicity.104 To cite an instance, during New Years’ 2015 in Cologne it is alleged that about 2,000
young, primarily Muslim men with non-European origins assaulted and mugged about 1,200
women, resulting in both widespread debates on immigration and PEGIDA marches. 105 Although
many Germans have been notably welcoming to the refugees, a portion of the German
population has been questioning the refugee and immigrant vetting process and whether
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immigrants and refugees can actually integrate into German society, sometimes due to these
often cited and highly-publicized crimes. This has pushed a portion of the population to the right
or has provided a scapegoat to the already far-right, and in more extreme cases, has resulted in
attacks on refugees and immigrants, online hate speech, and more Germans joining movements
like PEGIDA and voting for the AfD.
The far-right also uses calculated incitement and promotes offensive speech. This
includes mocking the use of gender inclusive language, expressing a desire for Germans to
openly state their national pride—which is often seen as a euphemistic expression for promoting
nationalism—and criticizing same-sex marriage.106 AfD political Björn Höcke, for example,
criticized the Holocaust memorial in Berlin, stating that Germans are “the only people in the
world to plant a monument of shame in the heart of their capital.”107 In a country where
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung means honoring the victims of the Holocaust,
statements like these are socially taboo. The AfD’s breaking of rhetorical taboos is even
calculated at times to garner attention: a leaked internal strategy report showed that shocking
remarks allow the AfD to gain a high amount of media attention. Therefore, breaking accepted
norms is strategic and helps keep the AfD in (inter)national conversation.108
The far-right also tends to have a digital advantage over competitors. The AfD, for
instance, is the most active party on the internet, and it strongly relies on social media platforms
like Facebook and Twitter that allow the party to quickly, easily, and affordably disseminate
messages across the world.109 This means that the AfD’s far-right rhetoric is quickly and easily
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available to many Germans. Furthermore, those on the far-right often play the victim. For
instance, some see the AfD as a threat to German democracy, but the AfD spins this around by
stating that they are actually experiencing the establishment trying to limit their democratic
rights.110 An example of this is the AfD’s Alice Wiedel walking out of a televised event because
she believed that the moderators mistreated her.111 Therefore, this fringe party wants to remain a
fringe party, seen as separate from the mainstream federal parties; like politically-oriented
football subcultures, their desire is not to fit in.
But this does not mean the establishment—or more centrist and mainstream
parties—responds with pure aversion. Despite some Germans seeing the rise of a far-right party
as a threat to both German society and the county’s Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung
efforts, some even more moderate politicians are having apathetic or approving attitudes towards
the AfD. For example, Stanislaw Tillich—a leading CDU politician and Saxony’s former
Minister President—responded to the AfD’s election success with “The people want Germany to
remain Germany. They do not want refugees to engage in religious and political disputes
here.”112 Tillich’s quote illustrates the idea that some mainstream German politicians are
sympathizing with the AfD’s nationalistic and/or xenophobic rhetoric.
From far-right underground networks to far-right parties, the German government has
also received criticism about its handling of violent far-right extremism. Writer and researcher
Denijal Jegic states that the CDU has done little to confront hate mongering; Jegic says that
far-right violence is often condemned by the government, “but, rarely taken seriously enough.”113
Jegic’s quote highlights, again, how the political extremists and the more centrist government are
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not necessarily completely positioned against one another. This is not to say that the majority or
even a high percentage of Germans are supportive of political extremism. However, the
mainstream, such as far-left and far-right political subcultures, is not a monolith and is not
fixed.114 This explains how some politicians—like Tillich, who represented the more moderate
CDU—will not display consistent political views. Overall, politics, political views, and political
cultures are complex and ever-changing. This thesis is interested in peoples’ primary political
leanings.
And the German government primarily expresses disdain against far-right extremism.
Like is sometimes the case for Die Linke, Burris notes that there is also a taboo of not working
with far-right parties in the country, which has led to the formation of new coalitions within the
federal government.115 Of course, there is also the extralegal barrier of promoting National
Socialism, which will be further explored. Combining this fact with earlier explorations, there
are taboos within the federal government of working with both far-right and far-left parties
because both the far-left and the far-right have “spawned dictatorships in Germany in the
past.”116
It is vital to understand these aforementioned concepts regarding the German federal
government for two main reasons. For one, democratic governments can reflect a country’s
population because the population votes in politicians or parties to represent it. The German
government’s parliamentary system is arguably even more representative than the American
system because of more proportional representation. Secondly, it is the government fighting to
maintain the establishment because it is the government who creates or contributes to creating
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laws and policies, in addition to condemning actions, contributing to what is considered a social
taboo. This second part is of primary importance for this thesis because laws, policies, and social
taboos affect how fans game-play. Overall, understanding what is going on on the federal-level
in Germany is necessary for understanding conflicts between the fringe and the establishment.
Analysts argue that when key political players have convergent tendencies—like the
German government—it can increase the tendency for mobilization around anti-establishment
themes within a country.117 It is the populist anti-establishment left and the anti-establishment
right that one sees in Germany historically and today, whether at a federal-level or at a
subculture-level. This thesis will consider the establishment in Germany to be dominant political
and social opinions of residents, the composition of the federal government in Germany—which
is largely centrist—and the laws and policies of the country. Through their objects and collective
actions, politically-oriented football fans are pushing back on the dominant ideologies in
Germany because the goal of their political extremism is to interrupt the functionings of the
establishment.118 Overall, much of far-left and far-right rhetoric from (politically extreme)
politicians and subcultures remains and strives to remain fringe. Germany’s politically extreme
football fans reflect trends in federal politics and build on Germany—especially East
Germany’s—opposition subcultures, which opposed the mainstream with unique means such as
their style and collective actions.
German Football Fans as a (Politically-Based) Subculture: Hooligans and Ultras
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Whilst right-wing and apolitical ultras groups were common in Germany, there were just
as many left-wing and anti-fascist ultras groups too. In Italy and almost everywhere else
in southern and eastern Europe I had visited, ultras had moved rightward, towards
ultra-nationalism and sometimes outright neo-fascism. But a large number of ultras
groups in Germany bucked the trend. And even if the politics of the groups differed, they
found that there was common ground on the key issues. They were against tough
policing. They were in favour of the 50+1 rule. Against high ticket prices and Monday
night football. One of Janni’s most famous actions was the “12:12” campaign, which saw
the Südtribüne, and other tribunes across Germany, go silent for the first 12 minutes and
12 seconds of a match because of the new safety measures brought in that reduced the
number of away tickets.
In his book 1312: Among the ultras, Montague highlights a unique fact about Germany’s
hardcore football fans, the hooligans and ultras: they are some of the most “politically active”
and “politically influential” fans in the world.119 To non-Germans attending German football
games, this can become quickly apparent. For example, Davidson—a British person accustomed
to British football—recounts how he had “never seen any real evidence of a collective left-wing
interest in football” before discovering St. Pauli.120 In this section, football fan culture will be
explored, along with different types of football fans, and why it is vital to look at Germany’s
unique politically-oriented football fans as a subculture, rather than merely a group.
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To understand the actions of football fans and how and why some of them converge
around political views, it is vital to first understand who exactly the hooligans and ultras are and
how their qualities overlap and differ. To start, ultras are fanatic and organized fans who tend to
use flares, tifo choreography—or a choreographed display of flags, banners, or signs—vocal
support, and other elaborate displays. Ultras are most often apolitical, but can display political
ideologies ranging from far-right expressions—such as promoting fascist tendencies like
nationalism—or far-left expressions—such as promoting antifascist and socialist ideologies.
Ultras who do display a political leaning almost always also display apolitical, purely team- or
area-supporting121 expressions. For example, some ultras groups for Borussia Dortmund wave
banners boasting how Dortmund is the beer capital (Bierhauptstadt) of Germany, while some
Borussia ultras display anti-Nazi messages at the same game.
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Borussia Dortmund ultras hold up a large banner saying “THREE POINTS FOR THE beer capital” (DREI
PUNKTE FÜR DIE Bierhauptstadt).122

Furthermore, there tend to be numerous ultras groups for one team. For instance, FC St.
Pauli has over 400 supporter clubs, with multiple St. Pauli fan groups fitting the qualities of what
an ultras group is.123 These supporters groups often differ between one another with respect to
traditions and beliefs, highlighting how football fans for the same team with similar political
leanings might not necessarily act as a monolith. Nevertheless, when it comes to teams with a
largely left-wing fan base, these ultras groups tend to all subscribe to common basic tenets. For
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example, registered St. Pauli’s supporters clubs must accept St. Pauli’s “self-concept statement.”
Point five of the statement reads: “Supporters clubs oppose all forms of discrimination against
people, all forms of racism, sexism and hooliganism, and all forms of disparagement and
discrimination against same-sex preferences and tendencies.”124 This underscores how fans of the
same team can differ between each other or between individual fan groups, but they tend to
converge around common values, beliefs, and ideas.125 In this case, St. Pauli fans are united by a
commitment to left-wing values.
The majority of ultras do not perform (or have the goal of performing) violent acts
because the main goal of ultras tends to be to support their team; this is where hooligans and
ultras primarily contrast. Hooligans are primarily focused on destruction of public and private
property and conflict with other hooligans centered on the goal of manifesting their ideals.126
Hooligans fighting-related actions range from spitting on others to using firearms and throwing
bricks. Riots might also increase when hooligans travel in firms—or a group of
hooligans—increasing the chance that hooligans groups will encounter one another.127 Many
attribute hooligan violence to psychological mechanisms such as mob mentality, but it is also
vital to note that a lot of these riots are preplanned and are not only a result of in-the-moment
mentalities. For example, some firms make plans to travel across international borders for the
intended purpose of rioting.128 Therefore, using psychological phenomena as an explanation does
not capture the entire picture of hooligans’ violence that is arranged in advance. This tendency
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for organized violence also means that hooligans can also have a more discreet appearance to get
around police control.129 For example, some firms wear commercialized brands and meet at
predetermined destinations.130
Violence continues to be a strong theme in academics’ studies of hooligans, with many
researchers investigating why hooligans have such a tendency for violence. One of the
conclusions for this question is that hooliganism reflects broader environmental issues.131
Namely, there can be a link between football hooligans’ violence and the sociopolitical issues
that they face outside of the stadium.132 This violence can help hooligans—who might feel
politically powerless due to often having roots in a working-class background—have a coping
strategy for dealing with the social problems that they face and gain a status,133 while also
pursuing their passion for football.
But this violence often backfires, broadly causing additional issues for football fans and
their reputation. For example, as one can see, this violence—although sometimes blown out of
proportion—has resulted in the creation of certain policies to prevent fan violence, such as the
implementation of stricter penalties to limit fans’ disorderly conduct and increased police
presence at games.134 Fans’ violence has even impacted the physical layout of stadiums. For
example, some stadiums have added in-stadium seating—rather than having mostly standing
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areas—to help break up fan groups, meaning that less members can gather together in one
area.135 This underscores the establishment’s broad responses to fan behavior, showing a
cause-and-effect-like tendency; namely, fans’ messages and actions can prompt a response from
the establishment if heard or viewed by it.
It is important to note that football hooligans tend to be far-right. As aforementioned, the
far-right has an “explicit predilection for violence”; with a tendency for violence and neo-Nazi
actions, the (far-right) hooligan subculture acts as a more micro reflection of the far-right
overall.136 But again, like most issues that this thesis touches on, there is not a black-and-white
distinction between hooligans and ultras. For instance, it is not only hooligans who are
violent—ultras can act violently, as well.137 Montague emphasizes this lack of a clear distinction
between hooligans and ultras when quoting a German ultra: “‘We have ultras groups which are
so violent that you cannot really separate them from hooliganism. We have left-wing
anti-violence groups, left-wing pro-violence groups, right-wing pro-violence groups and
everything in between.’”138 Similarly, Miller-Idriss defines the far-right youth subculture, which
includes football hooligans as “youth who are either actively engaged or quietly supportive of
nationalist or exclusionary platforms that seek to maintain or restore national
ethnoscapes…reflect an idealized community.”139 For the purpose of this thesis, it will be
considered that if they are political, hooligans tend to be far-right—expressing racist and
xenophobic beliefs—and violent.140
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Because of stereotypes—like that hardcore fans are violent—fans’ relationship with
police is quite complex. Both hooligans and ultras can have a tendency for illegal actions, so
these fans can often be wary of a police presence, with politically-oriented fans adding a layer of
complexity because of being against police for more ideological reasons. The relationship
between police and fans should also be examined because as aforementioned, police presence in
the fan space has increased both inside and outside of the stadium throughout the years. For
example, additional police stations have been added to stadiums throughout Germany, and some
ultras have had their homes raided by police who were looking for pyrotechnics and banners.141
However, ultras interviewed by Montague “[Ben and Haggi] couldn't really understand why the
state used so many resources to control them,” citing how no one had died in German football
since 2008 and how new, safer techniques like “cold pyro” were being explored by fellow
fans.142 At the same time, it is the very nature of youth (sub)cultures—like the football fan
culture—to push the “boundaries and limits” of what the establishment puts in place. Ben also
stated: “You have certain rules within society and you will break certain rules. That's it with a
youth culture. Young people trying to test what they can do and what they can't do.”143 Fan
cultures—including politically-oriented hooligan and ultras cultures—can differ in their styles,
messages, and actions, but are often both highly “All Cops Are Bastards”-oriented. 144 This is not
to say that politically-oriented fans always have a negative relationship with police; however, the
mix of a police presence and the German politically-based fan culture has had negative
implications.
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One example of a negative and arguably dangerous implication is that introducing more
police stations at football games due to fans’ violence helped drive the “hooligans underground,”
rather than eliminating them.145 In a similar vein, Montague notes how the police presence has
pushed German football fan culture in a different direction: “Germany's ultras scene was perhaps
the most political I'd ever encountered. But it was also changing. As the police cracked down
harder, the scene had started to become more violent, mixing both hooliganism and the purer
ultras scene that had arrived from Italy in the 1980s.”146 Therefore, an increased police presence
does not abolish violent, right-wing hooliganism. Rather, increased police presence can
encourage the scene to find creative ways to subvert restrictions put in place by the
establishment, occasionally causing the fans to become more aggressive as a retaliation. Overall,
fans’ issues with police mirror the establishment versus anti-establishment phenomena, with
police representing the establishment, and politically-oriented fans representing the
anti-establishment.
Another complicated relationship that hardcore football fans have is with the media,
partly due to how the media can perpetuate negative stereotypes regarding fans. The media, for
example, can vilify football fans or hooligans beyond the incriminating actions that the hooligans
have actually performed by making it seem like hooligans’ violence is more prevalent than it
actually is through extensive coverage of some fans’ antisocial behavior.147 The media frequently
covering fans’ violence likely contributes to people having a sort of availability bias towards
fans; that is, people who see this coverage perceive fans' antisocial behavior as more
representative than it actually is. Another consequence of this bias is that outsiders can mix up
types of fans, further blurring the distinction between them and broadly applying stereotypes to
145
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fans.Like increased police presence, the media’s coverage of hardcore football fans can also have
negative implications. For example, the media can reinforce some hooligans’ violent behavior
because it helps the hooligans’ riots gain public recognition.148 This vilification, especially by
the media, is considered to be a major factor for the creation of sport policies that monitor and
control fans’ behaviors for the purpose of preventing violence.
Another common feature of the football fan subcultures on both sides of the political
spectrum is the embracement of hyper-masculinity. There are women in the fan scene. For
example, Babelsberg 03 has Fan-Tastic Females—which focuses on the role of women in the
Babelsberg 03 fan culture—but a majority of hooligans and ultras are men.149 Masculine themes
will be further explored in subsequent chapters.
When looking at far-left and far-right football fans—including hooligans and ultras—it is
also important to view them as a subculture that unites around specific values and themes, rather
than looking at them as individuals or simply as a group.150 For one, subcultures tend to be
class-based, and when it comes to the football fans of interest, one can see that many of them
come from working class backgrounds.151 According to some of the first subcultural theorists,
deviance from subculturalists—or those in a subculture—can be a result of social and
environmental problems, usually related to a geographical location.152 Therefore, fans’
lower-class background that possibly results from environmental factors like lack of
opportunities can go hand-in-hand with fans’ orientation towards deviant behavior, or a
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“collective desire to ‘act out’” against the established values of a society.153 A lot of a
subculture’s resistance is channeled through styles and rituals,154 which football fans highly rely
on.155 This includes certain aesthetics—like some football hooligans emulating a more
sophisticated style—and certain actions—like teams playing a specific well-known song before
games start. These styles and rituals can differ from team to team, but overall, far-left fans and
far-right fans have common styles and rituals, respectively.
Likewise, those in a subculture share ever-changing “values, practices, and cultural
objects,” which help distinguish the subculture from the main culture.156 One can see this with
politically-oriented fans and their shared distinct meanings that are unique to their subculture.
Hooligans, for example, share several distinct themes, such as masculinity, aggressiveness, and
often, xenophobia.157 Furthermore, politically-oriented fans also share styles and rituals through
which these common meanings are channeled, like displaying political messages on shirts and
holding up banners showing messages with aggressive tones.
Styles, rituals, and meanings are preserved and disseminated through fans’ diffuse
networks. A subculture typically does not typically have formal leadership or formal
membership and boundaries are fluid; one is also not restricted to interacting only with the
subculture.158 When it comes to football fans, one can join a politically-based fan subculture by
displaying politically-based cultural objects, attending games, and helping organize
socio-political efforts. The increasing prevalence of technology helps fans’ diffuse networks
operate by helping fans stay in contact with one another, to, for example, plan meetings.159
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Technology also blurs the line between the boundaries of the subculture and those not in the
subculture as it helps the subculture be more accessible to the mainstream through, for example,
politically-oriented fans’ social media accounts.
A subculture is also often resistant against the main culture; this resistance can be passive
or active, at the micro or macro level, and covert or overt.160 Of special interest is a type of
“symbolic resistance” when it comes to football fans. Dick Hebdige, author of the
groundbreaking book Subculture: The Meaning of Style argues that subcultures usually consist of
the working-class and that these individuals manage their “status problems” by establishing new
norms.161 These norms have ideological implications and result in symbolic forms of resistance,
which can involve appropriating objects and styles of the dominant culture or other subcultures
in a given society.162 Subcultures, and their messages channeled through symbols and styles,
according to Hebdige, can act as a type of noise or a “...semantic disorder: a kind of temporary
blockage in the system of representation.”163 Politically-oriented football fans, for instance, resist
the dominant culture through banners, stickers, and shirts overtly expressing fringe political
views. They can also utilize certain distracting styles, similar to Germany’s punks in the latter
half of the 20th century. At the same time, some fans will express extreme political views
through coded, disguised symbols to avoid detection from the mainstream. All in all,
subcultures’ resistance efforts are multifaceted and seek to promote defiance.
Furthermore, subcultures tend to experience shared marginalization. In Howard Becker’s
labeling theory, the dominant social group—or the establishment—is the “in group,” which
determines who the “out group” is based on the fact that the out group cannot perform the same

160

Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 81.
Hebdige, Subculture, 82.
162
Hebdige, Subculture, 26.
163
Hebdige, Subculture, 90.
161

Garner 54

values and norms as the in group.164 Subculturalists are “deviant” because they do not meet the
norms of the establishment, and are therefore marginalized. It is vital to note that subculturalists
can choose this marginalization.165 For example, far-right football fans can be deviant because
they might choose to break the German laws through illegal actions such as Nazi salutes at
football games. In this example, the far-right fans are aware that their actions will result in
marginalization because of social taboos and legal restrictions against (some) far-right extremist
actions. Similarly, those in a subculture can embrace interrupting the main culture with deviant
styles and rhetoric, like with politically-based fans displaying banners including explicit words.
A banner reading “FUCK” in large letters at a football game is arguably quite distracting. Again,
although they might have already been marginalized for their divergent interests, fans are able to
(at times) choose their own marginalization with deviant styles.
Subcultures also often have stratification, shared values, and specialized vocabulary. The
stratification within the subculture is a result of the subculture’s changing values and can relate
to cultural or symbolic assets and authenticity.”166 In regards to football fans, hooligans can gain
status and a degree of authenticity within their group through confrontational challenges of an
equal and display common interests in “social spaces” and “consumption patterns” and believe
that hooliganism is a way of life, showing shared values among the subculture.167 Similarly,
hooligans also often also share a working class background; again, inclusion within their group
can give them a feeling of status, exhibiting a shared value of inclusion among the
subculturalists.168 But the values of the subculture are not exactly fixed. For example, some
football fan groups can move in the opposite direction of which they were originally in. Borussia
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Dortmund's Desperados, set up in 1999, was originally run on “inclusive, activist principles.”
After the founder of the group, Janni, left the country, the group began to become more right and
became known as a violent ultras group, highlighting the potential flux of some of the fans’
values.169 Fans’ lack of set leadership and tendency to fluctuate underscores the stratification of
the fan subculture.
Although a class-basis, a use of styles and rituals, stratification, shared values, specialized
vocabulary, shared distinct meanings and marginalization, resistance, and diffuse networks are
important features of subcultures, according to many ethnographers, a shared identity is the most
important quality that distinguishes a subculture from an average social group.170 A collective
identity among a subculture, which can be unifying, can innately connect a subculturalist with
their fellow group members, even if a subculturalist does not have an individual relationship with
each person in their subculture.171 For example, St. Pauli fans act as an extended family: when
the St. Pauli fan “Mini” fell 15ft from a football stadium terrace onto concrete, he received
financial support from St. Pauli fans around the world and club officials and players, regardless
of whether he actually knew them individually.172 Similarly, fans can teach one another how to
“be” fans, or in other words, to perpetuate the identity. For instance, Davidson recalls St. Pauli
fans teaching other attendees how to unfurl and throw a till roll to participate in the St. Pauli fan
culture at a game, as if subculturalists were “inviting” others to share the identity. Lastly, when
outsiders perceive the politically-based fans through the media or through seeing them at games
or other events, outsiders often perceive these fans as a unit. When fans hold up a banner, for
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instance, viewers do not focus on the individual faces of the fans holding up the banner, but the
identities of the fans become blurred under the message of the whole (banner).
But again, it is important to emphasize that fan groups are not a monolith. Ultras can
differ between teams, or even within the fandom of a singular team, which can even result in
diversions or stratification within the subculture. For example, Montague mentions a falling out
between the Babelsberg 03 ultras groups Filmstadt Infernos and the Bulldogs.173 As Janni, the
founder of Borussia Dortmund’s Desperados stated that being an ultras is more about following
“‘a cultural code.’”174 Overall, far-left and far-right football fans’ shared values can fall under
several commonalities: “Against modern football. Against commercialisation. Solidarity with
your allies. Scorn for your enemies. And, above all, resentment towards the police.”175 This
underscores the fact that although seemingly oxymoronic, both stratification and a shared
identity can co-exist among the football fan subculture(s): fans can differ between one another,
but they fall under the same “shared identity” umbrella. Mohr highlights this distinct
interconnectedness of the politically-oriented football fan subculture well: “If the kids are united,
they will never be divided.”176
The Role of Psychological Phenomena
The human is not, however, the passive recipient of his culture, and his individual
behavior is not a passive collection of elements randomly combined out of elements
maintained in the group. The psychological mechanisms of an individual choose which
behaviors observed in surrounding individuals will be adopted, which will be rejected,
which will be newly created to fill a need, and they additionally determine how these
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elements of different origin will be integrated. These choices will be made according to
the evolved algorithm of the relevant psychological mechanisms (as activated by personal
circumstances and available information).177
The intersection of psychology and cultural studies is essential because without the
former, one would look at cultural behavior without a (scientific) basis of why this behavior
occurs. As psychologists Lena Cosmides and John Tooby state in their above quote,
psychological mechanisms are the floor for culture, which is a result of innate psychological
mechanisms being impacted by the environment. In other words, “learning and culture are
phenomena to be explained, and not explanations themselves,”178 highlighting that culture is not
the most foundational driving factor of behavior. It is therefore vital to not only look at fans’
behavior—or what are seen as cultural processes—but also the psychological mechanisms179 that
drive behavior, and how the environment—like being in a high energy crowd at a football
game—further shapes behavior.
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It is vital to consider politically-oriented hooligans and ultras as a subculture because
their performance is not possible at the individual level because the subculture relies so heavily
on collective actions and collective expression through a collective identity. However,
individual-level psychological phenomena do occur among football fans, which has implications
for the functioning of the subcultures on a collective-scale.
One example of a more individual-level phenomena among fans is cognitive dissonance,
or experiencing two cognitions or a cognition and a behavior that clash with one another.180 In
regards to fans, cognitive dissonance can be following what the football subculture does, even if
it means acting in ways that go against the fan’s individual values.181 For example, one might
stand on a football terrace with someone who is performing a “Hitler salute”; if standing with
someone acting anti-semitically goes the fan’s individual values, their mind can find a way to
justify standing with the anti-semitic person in order to protect their to perception of self. This
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dissonance between mind and behavior often results in rationalization. In the case of standing
next to another football fan doing a Hitler salute, one might tell themself messages to justify their
own behavior such as it is not a big deal to stand next to them or maybe they are cheering, rather
than doing a Hitler salute. With these justifying messages, fans can feel more comfortable with
obscene or irrational behavior.
There is also a strong social element to cognitive dissonance. That is, irrational beliefs
can act as a “glue” for certain groups, and dissonance reduction “depends on social factors.”182
Discordant beliefs often occur often in a group setting, and one way to mediate these irrational
beliefs is to separate the person from their group.183 When looking at football fans, one can
assume that a fan’s actions and beliefs in an individual setting are likely going to appear to be
less irrational and less obscene than those occurring in a group setting because of the social
factors of cognitive dissonance. This idea offers insight to both explanation of political
extremism among politically-oriented football subcultures and intervention for political
extremism.
Another consequence of cognitive dissonance is that if one goes through extreme
measures with the group or to join the group, this might further decrease dissonance.184 Going
through the rough process to get into the group causes people's cognition to match the effort they
put in to join it: people can unconsciously focus “on whatever might be good or interesting about
the group and [blind] themselves to [the group’s] prominent negatives.”185 Namely, if one puts a
large amount of energy or effort into joining a group, they are likely to justify and continue their
membership in it.186
182

Robert Kurzban and C. Athena Aktipis, “Modularity and the Social Mind: Are Psychologists Too Self-ish?” Pers
Soc Psychol Rev 11, no. 131 (2007): 131-149. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868306294906.
183
Kurzban et al., “Modularity and the Social Mind,” 139.
184
Aronson and Tavris, “The Role of Cognitive Dissonance.”
185
Aronson and Tavris, “The Role of Cognitive Dissonance.”
186
Aronson and Tavris, “The Role of Cognitive Dissonance.”

Garner 60

Another psychological phenomena to consider when looking at football fans on a more
individual-level is one’s individual attributes. One can ask, why are these specific individuals
attracted to this specific subculture? Perhaps the answer lies in personality. Interestingly, a 2020
study by Janko Međedović and Uroš Kovačević explored Serbian football fans' individual
characteristics and found that football fans (N=128) had higher scores in all criminal attitude
scales that the researchers utilized, including a Violence Scale, Entitlement Scale, Antisocial
Intent scale, and Associates Scale, in addition to higher scores on the trait sadism than the control
group (N=118).187 The study found that membership in a football fan group was the most
important predictor of the four measures of criminal behavior.188 According to Međedović and
Kovačević, “this means that football fans were more prone to engage in physical violence,
antisocial behavior and delinquency, they are centered on their own interests, and reported a
higher frequency of criminal peers, than the participants in the control group.”189 While more
research is needed, this study lays the groundwork for the fascinating idea that football
fans—especially those with more violent tendencies, like hooligans—have a different personality
profile than the general population. It is still highly important to note that behavior is often a
result of both nature and nurture, so it is possible that fans’ behavior results from the presence of
their subculture and their intrinsic personality profiles.
At the group level, the idea of cohesiveness provides valuable insights.
Football—perhaps sports overall—revolves around the idea of unity. The team needs to work
together to score goals and the fans need to work together to show large-scale support for their
team, often with the goal of surpassing other fans’ support for their respective team. Overall,
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group cohesiveness affects both how the group is structured and how exactly the group functions,
with high cohesiveness having both positive and negative implications.190 For example, group
cohesion can have multiple benefits, such as cohesive groups having an ability to more
effectively accomplish goals than non-cohesive groups.191 On the other hand, high-cohesiveness
can also result in lower quality decision making. This is possibly because the tighter-knit a group
becomes, the less individual members are willing to interrupt the group’s harmony.192 Research
also shows that in high stress situations, group cohesiveness often increases.193 Football games
can be high stress situations, with tense wins and losses and the perception of other fans as the
“enemy”; it is therefore unsurprising that one might see both poor decision making and the
successful accomplishing of (negative and positive) goals among football fan subcultures, who
often have a unified—or cohesive—identity. Similarly, the concept of identity fusion—or the
feeling of “oneness” that fans can feel with their teams—is also interesting here.194 Fusion to a
football club is “associated with lifelong loyalty to the club” and violence towards fans of other
teams. This fusion can also result in extreme behaviors from fans, including a willingness to die
for one’s fellow fans, further highlighting the implications of fans’ cohesiveness. 195
Research also points to the physiological basis of the relationship between football
attendance and group cohesion. Newson et al.’s study found that football spectators had elevated
levels of cortisol—or the stress hormone—especially during a loss, and that cortisol increases
were highest in participants with the highest level of fandom, highlighting football’s potential to
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especially arouse those who strongly support a specific football team.196 This study found that it
is this very stress that contributes to the formation of alliances.197 Therefore, the physiological
responses that naturally result from football games can contribute to a degree of fandom. This
shows how football is a fruitful opportunity for forming social bonds, which can again,
contribute to poorer or more successful decision making and execution. In the similar vein of
physiological responses, the presence of alcohol—which Davidson notes as particularly unique
to German football—also has been associated with public disorder like football hooliganism and
vandalism because fans' inhibitions decrease when they drink.198
Another psychological phenomena on the group-level to consider is the concept of
groupthink, or decision making as a group, rather than through individual input and decisions. It
is vital to note that groupthink does not occur in all situations involving decision making among
a group; rather, there are antecedent conditions that can result in it and other psychological
consequences.199 This can be directly applied to the behavior of football fans at the group level.
In the diagram below—which highlights a wide variety of antecedent conditions that, in
conjunction with one another, can result in strong observable consequences—hooligans and
ultras groups especially fall under the antecedent categories of B-1-4 (“Homogeneity of
Members’ Social Background and Ideology”) and B-2-1 (“High Stress from External Threats
With Low Hope of a Better Solution Than the Leader’s”). This is in addition fans already being
an already cohesive group meeting other antecedent conditions. In regards to the B-1
classification of antecedent conditions of groupthink, hooligans and ultras tend to have a similar
ideological and social background, like a similar political-orientation and a shared working-class
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background. In regards to the B-2 classification of antecedent conditions, sports games can
already be high stress environments, and the presence of rival teams and fans presents an
additional external threat, and the best solution to which seems to come from those who have a
more leadership role among the group. This can result in a myriad of consequences, that, in
simplification, can result in a groupthink (concurrence) tendency.
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Another psychological phenomena that likely occurs among football fans at the
group-level is the concept of risky shift.201 Decision making can be an interactive process, and
when decisions are made in a group, they might not equal the average of the individuals when a
“risky dimension” of the decision is involved.202 That is, people's decisions can “become more
extreme and risky when acting as part of a group,” resulting in group decisions that “are bolder,”
“more adventurous,” and high-risk.203 On the other hand, sometimes decision making at the
group-level can result in decisions that are more conservative than those at the individual level,
resulting in a cautious shift.204 One of the determinants of whether the group will have a cautious
shift or a risky shift depends on “the group's initial tendency toward risk.”205 Risky shift overall
reflects the main conclusion of this section: fans’ individual personality profile and
experiences—like cognitive dissonance—and being a part of a highly cohesive group can
contribute to fans’ seemingly irrational behavior. 206
Football as a Means for Political Expression and Mobilization
The structure of ultras groups has led to a proliferation of supporter-led activism in
Germany’s stadiums. Banners and choreo would send whatever message was important to
them that week, not just in the stadium, but around the world, meaning that any
choreography produced by The Unity, according to Jonas Gabler, was on TV in the best
time...I think that this is one of the things that is so fascinating for young people that you
have such big visibility.207
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As Montague highlights in the above quote, one can see that throughout the twentieth and
twenty-first century, football has acted as a means for political expression, with both those on the
far-left and far-right using football as an apparatus for organizing and disseminating political
messages. A fundamental question remains: why football?
One answer is that football has the innate and unique feature that it is a highly visible
sport with an accessible means of infiltration and dissemination. That is, football—on various
levels—is broadcasted, can have hundreds or thousands of attendees, and can be attended by
almost anyone, providing the opportunity for some to easily “harness a platform.”208 For
instance, football is the most popular sport in Germany and worldwide. Germany notably has
over 25,000 football clubs, some of which—like FC Bayern Munich and FC Schalke 04—boast
membership in the hundreds of thousands.209 The German Football Association (Deutscher
Fussball-Bund, or DFB) has over 6.8 million members as of 2020, which makes it “one of the
biggest social networks in Germany.”210 This high visibility means that football is inherently
influential, and therefore, inherently highly political. Montague underscores this point: “It's crazy
to think that politics have nothing to do with football because it has everything to do with it.
There are eighty thousand people here right now.”211 One can see through the fact that from St.
Pauli to FC Energie Cottbus and non-politically-oriented clubs, many German teams also have
fans worldwide, meaning that teams’ games and fans’ actions can have international influence.
For example, the East River Pirates are a St. Pauli supporters club based in New York City, who
gather to watch St. Pauli games and follow a similar political culture as St. Pauli, such as by
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raising money for the Immigrant Defense Project initiative.212 What originally started as an
obscure alternative left-wing fan base for St. Pauli has enabled the team to gain cult status and a
worldwide (political) influence.

East River Pirates—a St. Pauli fan club based in New York City—pose for a photo with members of St.
Pauli, wearing St. Pauli tee shirts and holding a St. Pauli rainbow flag.213

Because of football’s popularity, it is also highly covered by the media; one can easily
watch football on television and read about football game results in magazines and newspapers.
For example, the most popular newspaper in Germany Bild has an entire section dedicated to
(German) football that it updates daily. Media coverage—albeit controversial because of the
negative light it sometimes puts fans in, which results in the perpetuation of stereotypes—also
covers the actions of football fans across Germany, in addition to social media platforms like
Instagram, Facebook, Reddit, YouTube, and Twitter also contributing to the visibility of football.
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Viewers can also stream games from sports sites, such as ESPN, or watch playbacks from games
on sources like YouTube. The prevalence of media and an interest in fans’ behavior from both
fellow fans and outsiders also means that if fans’ actions occur outside of the stadium—such as
through a protest on the street—media will likely capture and publicize it, overall contributing to
the political power of football (fans) and the dissemination of ideas through football. Montague
underscores how the ultras appreciate this media coverage: “The ultras...crave exposure. And
power.”214 To fans, limelight can mean power and therefore political influence.
In conjunction with media coverage, the physical shape of football fields also means that
attendees usually have a 180 degree view and can see most other attendees, increasing their
ability to view what is occurring at football games. Typically, one can glance left and right to see
what fellow fans are doing or glance across the field to similarly see what fans for the opposing
team are doing. The shape of football fields also means that during live streams or playbacks of
the games, the fans and their displayed political messages can be highly visible because it is
challenging to capture the game without capturing the fans in the background. This means that
even if the person streaming the game did not intend to publicize political messages, by
broadcasting the fans and their political messages in the background of the game, media sources
and streamers are inadvertently spreading fans’ political messages. The photo below shows a
screencap of a 2020 game between Babelsberg 03 and FC Energie Cottbus, during which
Babelsberg fans’ politically-oriented banners—like Babelsberg’s “against HOMOPHOBIA”
(gegen HOMOPHOBIE) banner—can be seen in the background. However, spreading an
ideology was not the purpose of the stream.
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In a YouTube playback of a 2020 FC Energie Cottbus versus Babelsberg 03 game, some of Babelsberg’s
left-wing banners can be seen in the background of the stream of the match.215

The fact that football games are considered entertaining also plays a role in why football
is used for political organization and disseminating political messages. For politically-oriented
fans, football can mean taking something serious—like racism and economic struggle—and
addressing these darker issues through a lighter means. Davidson notes how this concept applies
to St. Pauli, such as during one of their protests against neo-Nazi and hooligan attacks: “St. Pauli
[uses] guerilla tactics of having ‘fun’ to get their message across.”216
Because football arguably has the primary purpose of entertainment, disseminating
political messages at football games helps these political messages be unavoidable. Consider
how football protests or demonstrations compare and contrast to different types of non-sports
related demonstrations. A typical political demonstration—which primarily has a political or
ideological purpose—can often be avoidable to those who want to avoid it. That is, those who,
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for example, do not want to hear pro-refugee messages can usually avoid going to a pro-refugee
demonstration. At the same time, there are also certain types of protests that are more
“interrupting.” For example, protestors can plan a sit-in protest or a protest blocking a major
street for the purpose of being both interrupting and unavoidable. Politics channeled through
football are often more similar to the latter type of protest. Namely, those going to football
matches do not always intend to see politically-oriented messages when they go; the majority of
those going to football games go for the sport—for the entertainment—and because football is
confined to a limited space and highly visible, fans’ political messages can become unavoidable
and interrupting to other (non-subculturalist) attendees.
Another reason that politically-oriented messages can be easily disseminated at football
games is that the cost to attend a German football game is considerably inexpensive, and as a
result, often accessible. Bundesliga ticket prices are some of the cheapest football tickets in
Europe,217 and some teams, such as Babelsberg 03, offer free entrance to games after the first
half.218 However, the fact that attending football games do have a price—whereas attending street
demonstrations is typically free—means that one could consider football as less accessible than
other means of political expression. While this is a valid point, attending football games offers a
2-in-1 deal: one is able to experience entertainment and participate in political expression,
meaning that one’s entertainment budget, free time, and socializing is serving multiple functions.
Another point to consider is that football can also act as an extension of the community it
represents, with fans' expressed political views representing the issues and voting trends of a
football team’s community. For instance, Chemnitzer and Cottbus fans are associated with

217

Montague, 1312, 203.
“Bundesliga Tickets in 2019/20," Bundesliga, last modified 2019,
ttps://www.bundesliga.com/en/bundesliga/news/tickets-2019-20-bayern-munich-borussia-dortmund-schalke-rb-leipz
ig-5342.
218

Garner 71

right-wing views, and one can see higher rates of voting for the AfD in these East German
cities.219 Overall, there is a triad of representation in football, with the fans, team, and city
representing and reflecting one another. Teams’ mixed fan base—like Energie Cottbus fans—can
also illustrate political juxtapositions in some German cities. That is, some cities with high
amounts of far-right activity additionally often have high amounts of far-left activity, and this is
represented in fans’ clashing activity. This again highlights how right-wing extremism is often a
causal agent for left-wing extremism. In other words, the right-wing extremists in these cities
have helped those on the left gain traction as a defense against the right.
Overall, football features several innate characteristics that make it ripe for political
organization and dissemination:
● The visibility of football: due to its popularity, football is highly covered by a
wide variety of media sources. This high coverage results in the
media—sometimes inadvertently—sharing politically-based fans’ fringe rhetoric.
The shape of the football field also means that attendees tend to have an
unobstructed view of other fans and attendees.
● The fun side of football: football—being a source of entertainment—can help fans
address dark issues in a lighter environment, in addition to helping make fans’
politically-oriented messages unavoidable to game attendees who primarily come
for the entertainment.
● The affordability of football: the low prices of football tickets—especially in
Germany—means that a wider range of people are able to attend football games.
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The 2-in-1 function of football tickets can also allow one to experience
entertainment and participate in or view fans’ political demonstrations.
● The psychological phenomena that occur through football: psychological
phenomena at the individual- and group-level can occur through football, serving
as factors that contribute to fans’ unique and sometimes dangerous behavior.
● Football as an extension of the community: there is a triad of representation in
football between the fans, team, and city. Overall, fans’ political orientation often
reflects the voting patterns of their community.
However, while football is highly visible and the ultras scene in Germany is more “open
to journalists and academic researchers” in comparison to other places like Eastern Europe,220
this does not mean that the fans are necessarily an open book. Politically-oriented fans often
embrace a juxtaposition of both secrecy and bold display. For example, some Babelsberg 03
ultras do not allow journalists to ride on the buses with them when returning home from away
games.221 Montague experienced this secrecy when researching for his book on football fan
culture after he got in trouble for riding on the bus with the Babelsberg Filmstadt Inferno ultras
and was placed in “solitary confinement” at the front of the bus. Montague felt like as an
outsider—or a non-subculturalist—and as if he was being equated to a threat: “The capo222
believed me to be as much an enemy as the neo-Nazis they fought week in week out.”223 Another
example of fans' wariness of journalists and researchers can be seen in regards to the reaction of
fan researcher Martin Thein being outed as an alleged agent for the Federal Office for the
Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, or Verfassungsschutz) after a
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2014 story breaking out in the news source Der Spiegel.224 After these allegations, there was an
uproar from fans, likely because fans’ wariness of outsiders and the potential of “spying” can be
due to the fact that football fans can have a tendency to do things that are illegal—or on the verge
of illegal—or taboo, and football is a platform for display, viewing, and secrecy. Namely, some
aspects of the politically-oriented football fan subculture involves purposely putting on a public
display, like through banners with bold, and clear messages, while other parts of the
politically-oriented football fan subcultures are meant to be kept more private. Right-wing
hooligans especially maintain an element of secrecy, as they tend to have more of an orientation
towards violent, illegal, and taboo actions.
All in all, using football as a means for political expression allows politically-oriented
football fan subcultures in Germany to take advantage of the innate and unique qualities of
German football. However, fans’ expressions are not without societal and legal constraints.
Germany’s societal taboos and the country’s laws and sport policies play a large role in shaping
and helping viewers interpret politically-based fans’ rhetoric through their cultural objects,
resulting in fans fluctuating between bold expression and secrecy.
Introduction to Laws and Policies of Interest
Fan culture, which is largely ultras-culture, is a kind of youth culture, and every youth
culture brings with it an element of anarchy, which rises up against the establishment.
The DFB and DFL will never be able to change that even if they try.225
Cultural studies largely involves a study of expression.226 However, many cultural
scholars tend to gloss over the fact that legal and policy frameworks are strong contributors to
how ideas are expressed in a given culture. Bernd Sauttter—spokesman for the fan culture
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preservation “FC Fairplay” initiative—underscores in the above quote how it is in the nature of
the football fan cultures to be a thorn in the establishment, which includes the DFB and DFL
(Deutsche Fußball Liga, or “German Football League”).227 It is therefore essential to understand
laws and policies in Germany which support or oppose left-wing and right-efforts to understand
how politically-oriented German football fans rise “up against” them.
When ananlyzing right-wing fans’ politically-oriented expressions—such as Chemnitzer
fans chanting antisemitic tropes at games—one is looking at fringe, right-wing extremist
sentiments in a country with some of the strongest hate speech regulations in the west.228 Part of
the Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung-related efforts in Germany have involved
codifying a stronger resistance to (expressed) hate and discrimination with the goal of preventing
future atrocities and to clean up Germany’s international image. According to professor of law
Robert A. Kahn, “when societies are forced to choose between tolerating extremist speech and
protecting the national image from charges of intolerance, the latter will generally be chosen,”
highlighting the relationship between law and national image. Well-known for crimes against
humanity during the Nazi regime, Germany often seeks ways to prevent being seen as Nazis.229
One section of German laws particularly relevant to Germany cleaning up their national
image is Germany’s introduction of hate speech laws, which again, are some of the strictest hate
speech laws in the west. In addition to the European Human Rights Convention weaking
freedom of speech, Germany’s codified protection of “personal honor” has made it essentially
illegal for a wide variety of hate speech to be expressed. Specifically, Article 5 of Germany’s
227
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Basic Law states that “everyone has the right to express and disseminate his opinion in word,
writing, and image and to be freely informed from generally accessible sources,” but that “this
right finds its barriers in the provisions of the general laws, the legal provisions for the protection
of the youth and in the right of personal honor.”230 Personal honor specifically regards one’s
dignity or reputation.
In a similar vein, Section 130 of the German Criminal Code has been used to convict
many right-wing leaders of using hate speech. Through Section 130, one can be subjected to up
to five years in prison for inciting “hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group
defined by their ethnic origin,” calling “for violent or arbitrary measures against them,” or for
violating “the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning or defaming one of
the aforementioned groups.”231 These restrictions are also not limited to spoken hate.
Disseminating material which “incites hatred,” “calls for violent or arbitrary measures,” or
“attacks the human dignity” against one of the aforementioned groups, can incur a penalty of up
to three year imprisonment or a fine.232 Similarly, Section 131 of German Criminal Code makes
it an offense to disseminate material which “glorifies” or “downplays” inhumane acts of
violence.233
Often, those in Germany are getting in legal trouble for the dissemination of Nazi-related
images, symbols, and messages, but laws and policies can paint a picture of politcal extemism on
both sides of the political spectrum being legally forbidden. Namely, politically extreme
organizations are often referred to as unconstitutional because they are considered to be a threat
to the German democracy; this unconstitutionality provides a basis for making these
230

Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,
Article 5.
231
Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, German Criminal Code, Section 130.
232
Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, German Criminal Code, Section 130.
233
Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, German Criminal Code, Section 130.

Garner 76

organizations and their associations illegal. For example, under Section 86a of the German
Criminal Code symbols of “unconstitutional organizations” not used in art, science, research, or
teaching, are outlawed.234 Unconstitutional organizations often include certain Nazi, Communist,
and Islamic extremist symbols, affecting their “symbols” like flags, slogans, forms of greetings,
among other cultural objects and actions. Often, laws do not name specific symbols that are
banned; that is, an exhaustive list of banned symbols does not exist and what is not allowed is
sometimes up to interpretation, especially if a modified symbol is being analyzed. It is also
important to note that context is highly important in regards to conviction. For example, the
swastika is outlawed when it is used in regards to völkish ideology—or an ideology revolving
around an idea of German superiority—but when the swastika is used as a symbol of religious
faith, it is legally allowed.
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Before the Nazis’ appropriation of it, cultures around the world have been using the swastika as a cultural
and religious symbol for thousands of years.235

Passed in 2017, Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) also helps codify
against hate speech, specifically in the realm of online.236 This law subjects most social media
platforms and other profit-making third-party content providers through which users can provide
content to fines of up to fifty million euros if they do not remove “obviously illegal speech” in
the limits of twenty-four hours of it being reported.237 Although there are certain provider
exceptions under the law, NetzDG applies to some of the most popular content providers,
including Facebook and Twitter.238 “Unlawful content” refers to almost two dozen sections of the
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German Criminal Code, including to content which disseminates “depictions of violence” and
“incites hatred.”239 The NetzDG law also highlights how Germany’s anti-discrimination laws
extend to various facets and are continuiously being implemented to adjust to how society
changes, including with an emphasis on hate speech circulated through technology.
The aforementioned laws in Germany’s Basic Law and Criminal Code make it clear that
Germany is attempting to codify against hate speech through laws and policies which
disproportionately affect the far-right rather than far-left because of the far-right’s predilection
for hate. Laws, however, are not the only ordinances that shape the ways that far-left and
far-right football fans in Germany express their political-orientation. The DFB and DFL are also
able to have a large impact on the action of fans—especially at the stadium—through the sport
policies that they implement. Throughout the years, the DFB, DFL, along with other European
policy-making bodies, have passed regulations akin to Germany’s hate speech laws, but more
specific to the playing field and football fans’ expressions. Examples of these documents and the
bodies that have implemented them are as follows:
● 2008: The “Resolution on the white paper on sport” was implemented between the
member states, European Parliament, and sport organizations. This measure invited
member states to take strict measures to combat racism and discrimination in sport.240
● 2009: The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) executive committee
approved guidelines to help referees deal with racist actions in stadiums. Through these
guidelines, referees can even suspend a match if fans are targeting a player with racist
insults.241
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● 2012: The “Resolution on the European dimension in sport” was implemented after
Member States were called upon by the European Parliament to create a legal basis for
banning “violent and discriminating fans from stadiums in a coordinated approach with
the sport federations.”242
● 2017: The European Parliament adopted the legally non-binding report “Integrated
approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity,”which condemns
discrimination in sport and calls for measures to prevent discrimination. This document
also emphasizes the importance for sport to integrate refugees, migrants, and asylum
seekers, and for amateur sport especially to prevent and combat radicalization.243
In addition to these specific document sthat outline policies that restrict right-wing
extremism, ghe DFB and DFL also promote anti-discrimination efforts in sport through positive
reinforcement. An example of this is the DFB’s “Julius Hirsch Prize,” which is awarded to
initiatives and individuals who show a strong commitment to anti-discrimination efforts in the
realm of football.244 The award commemorates Julius Hirsch, who was a Jewish German national
football player excluded from his club and murdered at the Auschwitz concentration camp in
1943.245 Similarly, in 2014, the DFL called for the “Pool for the promotion of innovative football
and fan culture,” which makes 500,000 euros available each season for promoting “activities for
tolerance and strengthening the commitment to civil society.”246 An example of this is the DFL
supporting the Centre for Democratic Culture, which promotes initiatives that challenge
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right-wing extremism.247 Furthermore, the DFL has regularly held “REX days,” during which
policymakers focus on “strategies against Right-wing extremism and discrimination in football”
for fans, security personnel, event managers, and fan projects, showing the DFL’s involvement in
football broadly, including in the fan culture.248
According to the DFB, funding is provided to socio-educational work “in a football
environment” at over 59 locations, with funding provided from the DFB or DFL—depending on
what the league the clubs are in—and the public sector. During the 2017/2018 season, the DFB
and DFL, for example, together invested about 6.6 million euros in fan projects. Vital to note, the
youth academies run by the clubs affiliated with the DFL must “demonstrate that they have
organised action days and information campaigns against racism and discrimination covering all
age groups” for the annual licensing and approval procedure. Therefore, teams are encouraged
by both honorary awards and monetary support to promote anti-discrimination activities through
certaining policies, such as those from the DFB and DFL. Left-wing fans—whose antifascist
activities are often aimed at fighting the rising tide of xenophobia—are the primary beneficiaries
of these positive reinforcements.
This is not to say that the DFB and DFL get along perfectly well with left-wing fans.
After the 1985 Heysel stadium disaster—when a human stampede occurred at a British football
game, killing 39 and injuring 600 attendees—the Council of Europe adopted the “Convention on
Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events,” which is focused on improving
cooperation between police forces and various football clubs and associations on an international
scale.249 Similarly, in 2002, the Council of Ministers of the EU agreed on stronger sport safety
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cooperations between Member States and in 2006, the Austrian government submitted an
initiative to the Council of Ministers to improve information exchange between police services
with the purpose of increasing safety at sport events.250 In 2016, the Council of Europe adopted
the revised “Convention on an integrated safety, security and service approach at football
matches and other sports events”—or Treaty 218—and in 2016, the Council of Ministers
approved the updated “EU Football Handbook,” which includes suggestions for international
police cooperation and measures to prevent violence.251 Under Treat 218, public and private
signatories—from fan organizations to police—were called upon to cooperate in preparing and
holding football matches, including ensuring that the infrastructure of stadiums complies with
national and international standards. The signatory states also agree to strengthen international
police work, in addition to creating the National Football Information Points (NFIP), which
includes points of contact in relation to sport-related safety, such as Germany’s Central
Information Center for Sports Operations (Zentrale Informationsstelle Sporteinsätze, or ZIS),
which monitors violent fans, like hooligans.252 Germany has yet to sign Treaty 218, but countries
that German football teams play against have signed it, and Germany is included on the NFIP,
highlighting the coordinated European effort to monitor football fans.253
Furthermore, in 2017, the European Parliament adopted the legally non-binding
“Integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity,” which again,
focuses on game safety broadly, from physical safety to corruption in sport. Fans’ role in sport
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integrity is also mentioned explicitly in the document: the document states that fans are
necessary in the fight against corruption in sport.254 This document also explicitly mentions
negative effects of hooliganism: “any act of violence, hooliganism and discrimination directed
against a group of persons or a member of such a group, whether in an amateur or a professional
sport, tarnishes its image and discourages spectators from attending sport events…”255 Overall,
the “Integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity” highlights
several key factors:
● The establishment is aware of various aspects of fan culture.
● The establishment understands that fan culture—especially hooliganism—can be
dangerous.
● The establishment sees implementing policies as a way to address the potential
dangerous implications of football fan culture.
The “Integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity”
also repeats the international fight against racism in sport, condemning “all forms of
discrimination and violence in sport, both on and off the field,” and underlines “the need to
prevent such behaviour at all levels, to improve the reporting and monitoring of such incidents
and to promote core values such as respect, friendship, tolerance and fair play” because “sports
organisations abiding by high standards of good governance are better equipped to promote the
societal role of sports and to fight racism, discrimination and violence…”256 The document also
mentions the fight against (right-wing) radicalization and the promotion of left-wing goals,
stating that the European Parliament:
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● “recognises the importance of grassroots sports in preventing and fighting
radicalisation, and encourages and supports initiatives in this respect”
● “welcomes two pilot projects adopted by the European Parliament: ‘Sport as a tool
for integration and social inclusion of the refugees’ and ‘Monitoring and coaching
through sports of youngsters at risk of radicalisation’”
Overall, policy-making bodies that make policies affecting German football and football
fans like the DFB and DFL often find eliminating discrimination an integral part of their statutes,
making it clear that they “fully supports European initiatives against racism and
discrimination.”257 Anti-right-wing extremism statutes are often explicit, such as with the DFB
stating that its clubs and member associations are supported in “implementing the
recommendations for action against right-wing extremism in sport”; therefore, these major sport
policy-making bodies are not simply against political extremism in sport as a whole, but
right-wing extremism specifically.258 This means that the German and European establishments
seek to primarily prevent and punish one side of political extremism in a de jure sense. This is
not to say that right-wing extremism does not flourish in Germany and in German football; one
can see how PEGIDA and the AfD’s have gained traction in recent years and how right-wing
fans will openly chant racial slurs. However, on paper, regulatory bodies in Germany outline
policies for preventing and repressing right-wing extremism and encouraging efforts to combat
discrimination.
In conjunction with these laws and policies, the German government has also trained
individuals—such as law enforcement and other investigative bodies—to be trained to recognize
far-right symbols. More recent clampdowns on far-right symbolism have resulted to a “change in
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the neo-Nazi uniform”;259 therefore, similar to other politically-oriented subcultures in Germany,
like the punks and skinheads, the recognition of these political symbols has pushed Germany’s
politically-oriented football fan subcultures to ensure that their styles, symbols, and messages are
in flux to avoid recognition (and then punishment) from the establishment. This is the basis of
politically-oriented fans’ game-playing.
At face value, the establishment’s efforts to quash right-wing extremism are in a de jure
sense promoting left-wing efforts; however, this does not paint the entire picture of what the
establishment supports.260 Left-wing ideology encapsulates more than fighting discrimination of
marginalized groups. Broadly, left-wing values—including those promoted by Die
Linke—encourage anti-capitalism efforts. In the realm of football, left-wing football fans
continuously fight to avoid the increasing commercialization and privatization of the game to
keep it a game of the people, mirroring left-wing anti-capitalism efforts. Fans are continuously at
odds with policy-making bodies over commercialization within the arena, including increased
advertisements in stadiums, corporate-sponsored shows at halftime, and corporate-sponsored
corner kicks and yellow or red cards.261 Parts of sport policies even support the
commercialization of sport, seeing it as a necessity. For example, the European Parliament’s
“Resolution on the white paper on sport” states that “in order to survive...the majority of
non-profit sports organisations need to raise revenues from some kind of commercial activity.”262
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Thus, left-wing fans are not only functioning as a defense against the right, but as a defense
against the establishment.

Tunisian’s Club Africain fans display a large banner reading “CREATED BY THE POOR, STOLEN BY THE
RICH,” highlighting the increasing commercialization of football on an international scale.263

Fans make their discontent with the policymaking bodies promoting the
commercialization of German football pronounced, with chants like “Shit DFB!” (Scheiss
DFB).264 During some of these events, those in charge and the media will occasionally attempt to
censor fans’ grievances against the policy-making bodies. For example, technicians dismantled
the TV cameras when fans at a Borussia Mönchengladbach vs. Leverkusen game shouted “Shit
DFB!” over Monday night games. In 2017/2018, second tier games began to have Monday night
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games, and many fans revolted: Monday night football meant that in order to go to their team's
games, fans would have to take off work to travel to the games, which was not possible for many
working-class fans. This instance further highlights the tension between working-class football
fans and policy-making bodies.

Football teams’ corporate sponsors are often displayed around football stadiums. Here, the athletic brand
Puma is displayed at Borussia’s Westfalenstadion.265

Although anti-capitalism is strongly a left-wing tenet, the fights against the
commercialization of football “cut across ideological barriers,”266 especially because
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politically-oriented fans on the left and right both tend to be working-class. A lot of these
anti-commercialization efforts are a small example of a larger effort from football fans “against
modern football” (Gegen den modernen Fußball). Fans have also generalized this movement,
comparing their feelings of restriction to Tibetian's lack of freedom, with Bayern Munich ultras
displaying a placard at a game reading “In Tibet and here: freedom instead of a police state.”267
Overall, fans prefer to be separate from the commercialization that the establishment promotes;
increased commercialization in football threatens the homespun culture of football fans, resulting
in them feeling like their freedom to express is affected.
Therefore, while laws and policies in Germany explicitly and repeatedly codify against
hate speech and discrimination—especially a racially or ethnically-based discrimination, which
is a key facet of right-wing extremism—they do not reinforce all left-wing efforts. This shows
that while the (fringe) expressions of right-wing football fans are often seen as more of an issue
to the establishment, the expressions of left-wing German football fans also remain to be fringe
rhetoric, albeit with certain aspects of left-wing ideology supported by German laws and
policies.
Overall, laws and policies can shape fans’ expression, whether it be politically-based
football fans limiting their rhetoric due to certain laws and policies, or football fans finding
creative ways, such as cultural objects, to get around recognized restrictions. Because of
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung efforts, laws and policies also play a role in impacting
how viewers interpret politically-based fans’ rhetoric through fans’ cultural objects and
collective actions. The next section on banners and other 2-D cultural objects from football fans
in Germany will tie together these ideas.
Chapter 1: Banners and Other 2-D Objects
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When a far-right march, connected in part to the local hooligan scene, turned violent in
the Eastern city of Chemnitz, Caillera raised a series of banners naming other cities
where attacks had taken place. “The Nazi Mob Is Raging, And The State Cooperates.
Germany, You’re Shit.” 268
It is clear that politically-oriented fans in Germany express their political views through
cultural objects and collective actions. One example of fans’ cultural expression is through the
two-dimensional objects of banners and stickers, which fans display both within and outside of
the stadium. Through using banners and stickers, fans are able to add special effects to their
“organized protest”269 at football games that can affect the way that fans’ political expressions
are perceived. Montague’s above quote illustrates the powerful effects that banners can have.
Common traits of many cultural objects of politically-based football fans—some more
common on one side of the political spectrum—are the following:
● A do-it-yourself (DIY) aesthetic: whether elaborate or simple, this look makes it
clear that the fans’ cultural objects were handmade with various mediums like
spray paint and markers. This DIY aesthetic also makes it clear that the particular
objects are original to the fans who made them.
● Or a consumeristic, repetitive aesthetic: while many of the fan objects are visibly
handmade, some of the fan objects are sold in stores. A consumeristic aesthetic
relates to an easier repetition of particular objects and styles, making these
commercialized objects more prevalent at times.
● A loud and proud aesthetic: with large, capitalized, and contrasting letters, many
of the fans’ cultural objects include straightforward and simple messages, often
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requiring little thinking from the viewers. This particular type of aesthetic is also
associated with an aesthetic of aggressiveness, showing that some fans are
accepting of or taking advantage of their aggressive reputation.
● Or an ambiguous aesthetic that requires “insider” knowledge to comprehend:
some of fans’ cultural objects convey messages utilizing symbols and more
unclear statements that provide a different meaning when the viewer has a
particular pre-existing knowledge or if the message is shown in a specific context.
● An illustrative aesthetic: this is a tactic that “shows” rather than “tells,” such as by
fans using drawings to get their message across. Artwork on the cultural objects
can range from highly detailed and talented work, to more simple and unadorned
work. Combining textual and visual elements can also be strategic, as it helps fans
show and tell.
This section will further explore how these aesthetics are displayed on football fans’
banners and other 2D objects, including how far-left and far-right fans compare and contrast in
their deployment of these aesthetics.
Comparing Far-Left and Far-Right Fans’ Banners
The banners at a SV Babelsberg 03 vs. SV Lichtenberg 47 game accentuates the specific
qualities that left-wing banners can utilize to interrupt both sport and society, as Lichtenberg
fans’ apolitical presentation provides a neutral ground for comparison. The first banner that will
be analyzed is the Babelsberg ultras’ banner below, reading DOWN WITH THE PATRIARCHY
(ABSTIEG FÜR DAS PATRIARCHAT). Although not exclusively a leftist ideal, overthrowing the
patriarchy tends to be a left-wing concept, encapsulated by the idea that women are exploited by
capitalism.
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Babelsberg fans display a banner with the phrase DOWN WITH THE PATRIARCHY (ABSTIEG FÜR DAS
PATRIARCHAT) at a 2020 SV Babelsberg 03 vs. SV Lichtenberg 47 game.270

One of the main features of this banner is its illustrative message. For instance, the
background behind the forefront anti-patriarchy message shows over fifty diverse and likely
female figures that were painted by fans. One can see that there is diversity in skin tone; albeit
most of the figures being white—probably representative of the German population by
race—there are some figures with varying degrees of darker skin tones. The female figures also
display other diverse qualities, with several of the figures wearing hijabs and having varying
degrees of gender presentation, ranging from a more feminine presentation to a more masculine
presentation. The latter is likely painted to show an inclusive presentation of women. The
figures in the background also show a diversity of flags that unite under the umbrella of left-wing
270
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philosophy, including the flag purple and black flag representing anarcha-feminism, the red flad
representing socialism, and the blue, pink, and white flag representing transgender pride. With
the use of an illustrative message, the left-wing Babelsberg fans who created and held up the
banner are able to clearly depict their idealized society where diverse women are recognized and
supported. Because the banner was clearly handmade, this banner is also distinct to the
Babelsberg fans and unique to specifically what these fans want. Babelsberg fans’ idealized
society as depicted in the banner—which supports trans-inclusive feminism—can be contrasted
against the AfD’s ideologies, especially as the party publicly mocks gender-inclusive language.
Furthermore, the words of the banner are also displayed with a loud and proud aggressive
aesthetic with confrontational tone. In addition to the banner featuring a demanding message, the
bold display of the command in all caps stands out as the black words contrast with the banner’s
white background, further making the words “loud” to viewers. The boldness of the words also
perpetuates the fans’ confidence in their message, as large and capital letters show that fans do
not have a desire to hide their words at times.
As seen with this Babelsberg banner, fans can use their handmade banners to encapsulate
their activism through image and text. Interestingly, this banner seems to have almost nothing to
actually do with football at face value; the banner could easily be displayed in a different context
related to left-wing activism. Here, one thus sees Babelsberg fans taking advantage of the high
visibility of football to display an almost purely progressive message.
This is a single example, but the photo below shows how prevalent the politically-based
fans and their cultural objects are for some teams; this ubiquity also means that as
aforementioned, the media will (sometimes inadvertently) capture fans’ politically-oriented
messages in the background of shots. For instance, it seems like this photo below is supposed to
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focus on the players, but the many banners in the background—including the pro-feminism
banner—are still quite salient in the shot.271 Like the contrast of the letters and background, the
black clothing of the fans also makes the colorful and large banners stick out, making it hard for
attendees to avoid seeing them. This is a prime example of fans using cultural objects to
“interrupt” the purely sport aspect of football games.

Babelsberg 03 fans’ politically-based cultural objects are salient in the background of football coverage.272

Another banner at the SV Babelsberg 03 vs. SV Lichtenberg 47 game shows similar, but
more simplified qualities. The below banner reads “FIGHT AGAINST RACISM IS PROMISED
1,000 TIMES FOR NAZI SON HOPP THE PROMISE IS BROKEN” (KAMPF GEGEN
RASSISMUS 1000MAL VERSPROCHEN FÜR NAZI SOHN HOPP WIRD DAS WORT
271
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GEBROCHEN). Dietmar Hopp is a software engineer and entrepreneur who put 300 million
euros into the Bundesliga team TSG 1899 Hoffenheim over a 20-year period of time.273 Fans’
anger over Hopp’s actions is in regards to Hopp helping commercialize and privatize the sport.

Babelsberg 03 fans hold up a banner reading “FIGHT AGAINST RACISM IS PROMISED 1,000 TIMES FOR
NAZI SON HOPP THE PROMISE IS BROKEN” (KAMPF GEGEN RASSISMUS 1000MAL VERSPROCHEN FÜR
NAZI SOHN HOPP WIRD DAS WORT GEBROCHEN).274

One can see this banner has similar qualities as the previously mentioned Babelsberg
banner, with bright all-caps letters contrasted against their background, showing a loud, proud,
and aggressive aesthetic. Like the last banner, this banner is also clearly homemade, but because
of the more simple lettering and the lack of decoration on the banner, it was clearly made more
quickly and with less effort. The simplicity of this banner also shows that extra, creative, and
detailed artwork is not necessarily compulsory for fans to get their message across. In this case,
273
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fans can show their disdain for the privatization of football with a straightforward banner,
underscoring the range of effort that politically-oriented football fans put into their cultural
objects.
Looking at SV Lichtenberg banners from the same game shows a lack of
politically-oriented messages, several shared features with the Babelsberg banners can be seen.
For example, like the Babelsberg banner, Lichtenburg fans used large and capitalized letters,
contrasting with the banner’s background. Through bold lettering, Lichtenberg fans show an
aesthetic of pride through their straightforward message. The Lichentenberg banner also appears
homemade, with nonuniform and simple lettering. Therefore, similar to the Babelsberg banner,
the Lichtenberg banner also shows a DIY aesthetic, showing that it is original to the fans and
their team.
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SV Lichtenberg 47 fans display a banner with the statement “SV Lichtenberg 47” at a 2020 SV Babelsberg 03 vs.
SV Lichtenberg 47 game.275

However, the Lichtenberg banner concentrates only on the team, while a high percentage
of Babelsberg fans’ banners are political in nature, while sometimes being focused on both
politics and team. Therefore, while the banners of both teams can take similar aesthetic and
communication approaches, their messages and delivery still differ, with some of Babelsberg’s
banners sometimes having little to do with football at face value by, for example, including a
more complex, diversity-focused background illustrative of the left-wing fans’ ideal society or
focusing more on anti-commercialization of the game rather than the actual performance of their
players.
Banners from left-wing Borussia Dortmund fans have similar qualities as the Babelsberg
banners. Borussia Dortmund is especially known for their complex choregraphies—or
choreos—combined with banners. For example, Dortmund’s “Yellow Wall” on their “South
Stand” (Südtribüne)276—created by several ultras groups in the 1990s—has about 25,000 fans
standing on it at every home game, holding up yellow flags and banners to hold up during games
or to assist in fans’ choreographed performances. 277 In the photo below, one can see a mix of
political and team-focused banners at Dortmund’s Yellow Wall.
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Fans at Dortmund’s highly active Yellow Wall hold up politically-oriented banners aimed against Nazis and racism.278

There are at least several large antifascist banners at the Dortmund game stating messages
like “UNITED AGAINST RACISM” and “UNCOVER AND FIGHT THE NAZIS” (NAZIS
ENTTARNEN UND BEKÄMPFEN). Like the Babelsberg banners, one can also see quite
straightforward messages here, also with a DIY aesthetic; overall, little thinking is required to
understand what the Dortmund fans want to get across and they want to be represented to outside
viewers.
Many of the banners created and displayed by left-wing football fans analyzed so far
feature a boldly loud and proud aesthetic. Namely, the messages the fans want to display are
often straightforward: the letters on the banners are large, clearly legible, capitalized, and in a
color that contrasts with the background of the banner, making the words pop out to viewers.
Far-right fans, however, might be more ambiguous with their communications. This could be due
278
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to the fact that a picture of someone holding a right-wing banner could be legal evidence for hate
speech convictions. Often, banners displayed by far-right football fans can be more ambiguous,
relying on the use of an “insider” knowledge of the symbols and messages deployed.279
Chemnitzer FC fans’ display mentioned in the introduction in honor of far-right activist Thomas
Haller is an example of this, as it relies on a degree of insider knowledge.

Chemnitzer Fans display two banners, with one reading “Rest in Peace, Tommy” (Ruhe in Frieden, Tommy) and
another featuring a large white cross, honoring the late far-right activist Thomas Haller.280

This display features two banners, with one reading “Rest in Peace, Tommy” (Ruhe in
Frieden, Tommy) and another featuring a large white cross. Here, one can see a juxtaposing
aesthetic of loud, proud, and aggressive, but also ambiguity. Chemnitzers fans clearly wanted
viewers to see their messages: the symbols are large, with the banner covering dozens of fans,
279
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and stand out through contrasting colors. However, while banners from many far-left fans tend to
display quite straightforward messages—like how Dortmund fans’ “UNITED AGAINST
RACISM” banner requires little interpretation to quickly understand fans’s message—unless one
has background knowledge of who Thomas Haller was and background knowledge of
Chemnitzer fans’ political leaning, viewers would likely question what this display means and to
whom Chemnitzer fans were referring to. Therefore, in order to understand the
political-orientation of this banner, one would need an extent of insider knowledge. The image
above capturing Chemnitzer fans’ display for Haller also shows politically-oriented football fans
functioning as a subculture as many of the fans in the background hold up scarves in support of
Haller, reflecting fans’ “shared identity.” Unified in action and appearance, the fans appear as a
unit with a far-right orientation thriving on inconspicuously game-playing with the
establishment’s restrictions through their cultural objects.
But like the far-left, far-right cultural objects in the realm of football will sometimes be
more conspicuous. For instance, in 2012, a far-right banner was shown in support of the violent
right-wing extremist group Dortmund National Resistance (NWDO) at a Dortmund game after
the group was banned, reading “Solidarity with the NWDO” (Solidarität mit dem NWDO).281 A
year and a half after the banner was flown, the 25-year-old who brought it—said to have
connections with the Dortmund hooligan group “Northside”—had to go to the regional court in
Dortmund for his actions, but ended up being acquitted.282 This case highlights the risks of the
far-right not strategically game-playing; salient far-right messages can at times result in legal
action, albeit not always prosecution.
281

“Prozess wegen Neonazi-Banner bei BVB-Spiel beginnt,” Der Westen, last modified January 1, 2014,
https://www.derwesten.de/staedte/dortmund/prozess-wegen-neonazi-banner-bei-bvb-spiel-beginnt-id8878926.html.
282
“Prozess wegen Neonazi-Banner.”; “Neonazi-Banner auf Südtribüne: 26-Jähriger freigesprochen,” 24 VEST, last
modified January 22, 2015,
https://www.24vest.de/sport/bvb/solidaritaet-nationalem-widerstand-neonazi-banner-suedtribuene-26-jaehriger-freig
esprochen-12455084.html.

Garner 99

In addition to the legal proceedings, after the occurrence of the NWDO banner being
displayed, BvB fans started a task-force with the purpose of combating right-wing extremism
and racism in the football stadium, in conjunction with the team enacting stronger regulations to
prevent right-wing extremism in football.283 The latter also highlights how the far-right and
far-left interact as a route of communication (or expression) with one another that reflects how
far-right extremism is the antecedent for left-wing extremism. Namely, a left-wing orientation is
often a response to right-wing extremism. For example, some Dortmund fans display a
fascist-orientation, and in response, some Dortmund fans display an antifascist-orientation.

Attendees hold a banner reading “Solidarity with the NWDO” (Solidarität mit dem NWDO) at a Borussia Dortmund
game, referring to the right-wing extremist organization “National Resistance Dortmund.”284

Game-playing can also involve a use of contextual details, which again, might require a
use of insider knowledge to understand political-orientation of the cultural objects. For example,
the aforementioned banner that Chemnitzer fans held up to commemorate Haller employs a use
of the Fraktur—or Black Letter—font, which is associated with being the “Nazi font”
throughout Europe.285 At one point in time, Fraktur was used throughout Germany and served as
a means of unification for the “nation without nationhood,”286 as “Germany” was essentially
283
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non-unified principalities, kingdoms, et cetera, until German unification in the 19th century.
Interestingly, in 1941, Nazis actually called for a ban on Fraktur because of the font using
“Schwabacher-Jewish letters”—which was actually an erroneous claim—with Hitler believing
that the “gothic romanticism” that Fraktur involved did not suit what was supposed to be
Germany’s transition to modernity. Thus, Germany transitioned to utilizing Roman letters during
the Third Reich.287
Today, the interpretation of the use of Fraktur highly depends on the context. For
example, Fraktur is commonly used as the font for newspapers, on restaurant labels, and for the
names of heavy metal bans, but in other contexts—such as the Chemnitzer fans' banner—it can
have “nationalistic tones.”288 In the instance of Haller’s banner, the far-right fans are likely using
Fraktur as an ode to a “traditional” Germany. In conjunction with perhaps not knowing about the
Nazi's later rejection of Fraktur, many nationalists are actually not employing Fraktur, but similar
looking fonts like the Old English Font,289 reflecting a historical ignorance.
The use of Fraktur also underscores the importance of context when looking at certain
symbols or aesthetics. It is generally considered acceptable when the Fraktur font is being used
to take advantage of the medieval or gothic appeal of the font.290 However, when used to promote
German superiority, it is considered nationalistic. Overall, when it comes to symbol bans in
Germany, context is highly important; again, one would likely not face legal trouble for
displaying a swastika at a religious temple, but they would face legal trouble for wearing one on
a jacket at a football match. In regards to the contextual implications of employing Fraktur, a
police anti-terror unit in Saxony was fined in 2017 for using a logo featuring a Fraktur font in

287
288
289
290

“Fraktur.”
“Fraktur.”
“Fraktur.”
“Fraktur.”

Garner 101

one of their vehicles because of what was considered an inappropriate context to use the font.291
Overall, small details like font can have heavy meanings—especially in the German
context—but the use of controversial symbols and aesthetics is complicated by which context
they are deployed.
The importance of context is further highlighted in regards to the display of the German
flag. For instance, in Germany, a proud display of the German flag can signal nationalism
because proud displays of the German flag during the (nationalistic) Third Reich were common.
One would likely need an extent of insider knowledge to understand in which contexts the
displayers of the German flag are doing it in a nationalistic way. A 2014 demonstration,
“Hooligans against Salafists” (HooGeSa)—which is a right-wing movement composed of
hooligans and non-football involved neo-Nazis with the aim of fighting against Islam
“infiltrating” Germany—demonstrated how context can affect interpretation.292 At the HooGeSa
demonstration, some of the 5,000 neo-Nazi and far-right293 attendees strived to be vague with
their political beliefs. For example, in one interview, an attendee stated that he is not
“right-wing,” but he was attending the demonstration to “stand up for his country.”294 This
highlights the far-right’s game-playing: because of laws, policies, and social taboos against
right-wing extremism in Germany, the quoted attendee used a pathos-oriented approach to justify
his presence at the demonstration.
The display of German flags at the HooGeSa demonstration also reflected a nationalistic
message, as these flags were displayed in the context of a right-wing demonstration. The first
291
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banner in the screengrab of the rally below features a statement written in black spray paint
reading “our flag, our country maximum resistance” (Unsere Fahne, unser Land maximaler
Widerstand). The latter screengrab features attendees holding up German flags that simply state
“Germany.” With the knowledge that these banners are being displayed in the context of a
demonstration against Islam in Germany, one learns that the attendees are holding up these flags
in a nationalistic manner, emulating Nazis’ idealized ethnically homogenous society. A simple
DIY message over the German flag gave it—albeit arguably inconspicuous—political
connotations, accentuated by the context that the flag was displayed. Overall, one can also see
how the pride of being a far-right comes into conflict with the necessity of remaining ambiguous.

A banner at the 2014 Hooligans against Salafists (HooGeSa) demonstration reads “Our flag, our country maximum
resistance” (Unsere Fahne, unser Land maximaler Widerstand) written in black spray paint on a German flag.295

There are also cases of far-right fans displaying more straightforward messages, but
hiding their individual identities to avoid the consequences of far-right extremism. Below is an
image of fans from the team FC Energie Cottbus celebrating Cottbus being promoted into the
third tier of the Bundesliga by marching through the city wearing KKK hoods and holding a
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banner reading “the rise of the evil” (Aufstieg des Bösen), written in a Fraktur-like script on a red
banner.296 In turn, FC Cottbus released a statement against the fans’ actions calling their actions
“inhumane, repugnant and in no way tolerable,” stating that the fans would face life-long bans if
they were identified.297 This instance highlights how it is essential for right-wing football fans to
conceal their identity if they want to do clearly right-wing actions or display clearly right-wing
cultural objects. Interestingly, in an oxymoronic way, the object to conceal the Cottbus fans’
identity was the object that resulted in issues for the fans.
Furthermore, the message of the fans is arguably not as straightforward as some of the
other banners; however, the self-labeling of “evil” shows that fans acknowledge how their
far-right perceptions are perceived in German society, especially among a culture promoting
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung. This is a clear example of far-right fans using fringe
rhetoric to interrupt society—as Cottbus fans’ actions were highly covered by the media and met
with outrage—while adjusting to the constraints of Germany’s laws and policies by remaining
inconspicuous with somewhat-ambiguous messaging and concealing their identity.
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Some FC Energie Cottbus fans’ celebrated Cottbus being promoted by marching through the city wearing KKK
hoods and holding a banner reading “the rise of the evil” (Aufstieg des Bösen).298

Overall, far-right fans use of ambiguity and concealment is likely due to the fact that
because of laws and policies in Germany that affect football fans—like Article 5 of Germany’s
Basic Law, Section 130 of the German Criminal Code, and the “Resolution on the European
dimension in sport”—deter those on the far-right from displaying their far-right messages in a
straightforward way to the degree that left-wing oriented fans do and can. Displaying messages
that require a degree of interpretation, background knowledge, and/or context cues allow those
on the far-right to avoid easily and quickly incriminating themselves. The fact that these
messages rely on a degree of interpretation and political-awareness also means that it is likely
that other politically-based fans are picking up on these more inconspicuous messages. This
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means that while some messages interrupt, others remain fringe, being more limited to
communication between politically-based fans or those seeking to understand them.
The Commercialization of Cultural Objects
Consumerism is a topic of importance when it comes to the cultural objects of far-left and
far-right football fans. As aforementioned, many laws and policies in Germany support in a
de-jure sense anti-discrimination efforts of left-wing football fans. However, left-wing ideology
incorporates more than addressing discrimination. That is, anti-capitalism beliefs are also a major
part of left-wing politics. Again, this idea has manifested into a strong anti-commercialization
effort that has resulted in rifts between football policy-making bodies like the DFL and DFB.
Anti-commercialization efforts can be channeled through banners. For instance, FC
Freiburg Schwarzwald fans displayed a banner reading “Kind Disappear” (Kind Verschwindet)
against Martin Kind, the president of Hannover who vocally opposed the fan-supported 50+1
rule—a German league rule since 1998 that requires clubs to have the majority of their own
voting rights, rather than an external investor.299 Kind was opposed to the 50+1 rule because—as
he stated—it would act as a “restraint on his investment” into the club and hinder “German clubs
from competing in Europe against countries that allowed almost unlimited investment.”300 Kind
stated that limiting business in football impedes Germany’s “sporting future.”301 However, the
50+1 model is highly supported by many football fans, inspiring fans around the world to aim for
a similar system.302
It should be noted that some teams do provide an exemption based on investment to the
50+1 rule, like TSG 1899 Hoffenheim provided an exception to Dietmar Hopp, who invested
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300 million into Hoffenheim.303 Similarly, Redbull bought the playing license to SSV
Markranstadt and changed the name of the team to RB Leipzig, claiming—much to the
skepticism of fans—that the RB did not stand for Redbull, but rather for Rasenballsport.304
Interestingly, the league actually prevents sponsors names being in clubs names,305 so sponsors
will also find ways to game-play to slip in commercialization to the game.
Fans have not been silent about their unhappiness with the increasing commercialization
of the game: protest after protest from ultras followed after RB Leipzig's promotions, with ultras
across Germany not attending away games against RB Leipzig after it reached Bundesliga-level
playing.306 Outside of the stadium, some fans also planned a campaign called “50+1 Stays!”
Within the span of four days, “a thousand different supporter organisations and ultras groups”
signed the campaign’s petition.307 This number more than doubled after a few more days, and
fans unfurled the signatories’ names on the printed petition at the DFL's annual general
meeting.308 These instances highlight both the solidarity and extensive networks of fans, in
addition to fans’ long-term and determined fight against commercializing German football.
Another example of fans’ anti-commercialization, pro-working class efforts in German
football is seen with the opposition against Monday night games. For example, Borussia fans
emptied their terrace for a game, which silenced the stadium, and Eintracht Frankfurt fans
covered the pitch in tennis balls to protest the Monday night games.309 Eventually, fans got their
way, as it was in the end “decided that Monday night football was more trouble than it was
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worth.”310 Consistent and distracting protests and demonstrations can pay off for fans, resulting
in the changes that they desire.
But in an oxymoronic way, politically-based football fans sometimes give in to
consumerism and capitalization: many politically-oriented fan items are easily available for
purchase (by anyone) online. For example, FC St. Pauli has an online Fanladen where one can
easily buy objects—from sweaters to blankets with St. Pauli’s symbol, the Totenkopf—online.
However, this self-imposed commodification is not entirely self-destructive to the football
subculture. Rather, the businesses that sell fans’ politically-based objects are often associated
with the teams and fans, meaning that the funds derived from these sellers go to financially
supporting the subculture. Giving into consumerism is therefore a way to actually (financially)
support political expression. The result is that because items can be purchased or copied, certain
items can display a consumeristic aesthetic, showing repetition of the object or symbol. This
consumeristic aesthetic helps others become more involved in the subculture, showing the unity,
but also the fluidity of the subculture. This repetitive, pattern-like aesthetic also makes the fans’
symbol or object take over how outsiders view fans. In the image below, it is as if the identity of
the fans—concealed by the images they are holding up—become the cultural objects they
display. That is, fans' collective identity “is” their cultural objects.
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St. Pauli fans hold up the same display of the Totenkopf symbol.311

St. Pauli’s arguably commercialized and highly replicated Totenkopf symbol also
demonstrates the power of symbols. Something simple—lacking written-out messages and many
details—can represent an association with a political movement. Like statements on banners,
symbols can also be ambiguous and have several meanings. For example, the skull and
crossbones at first glance could represent anything, or be associated with the Nazi-use of the
Totenkopf symbol. But with the insider knowledge of the St. Pauli subculture, one knows that it
represents a team and fan culture that fight for progressive values. Many fans utilize symbols in
an apolitical-sense, but for a team with a prominent politically-oriented fan culture like St. Pauli,
a symbol can represent a fan base’s political movement.
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Highly commercialized symbols can be used strategically, as when highly produced and
therefore repeated, they can become widespread. In regards to the Totenkopf, fans are able to
show support for St. Pauli through reproduced and printed Totenkopfs on posters, stickers, and
clothing. Similarly, stickers—which can quickly be printed by the hundreds—can have an even
more prevalent effect outside of the stadium. Fans will stick stickers around buildings, stadiums,
and restaurants, which increases the visibility of the team and their associated ideas. Since
stickers are available for purchase and are repeated, this also means that stickers can give off a
consumeristic aesthetic, with the same team sticker repeated through cities. For example, the
“Energie Fans Against Nazis!” stickers appear throughout Germany and Europe, highlighting
how moving away from a DIY-aesthetic can help the subculture become more widespread and
appear more prevalent, leaving a (literal) mark on societies around the world. But again, when it
comes to cases like the Totenkopf and fans’ stickers, these objects are often commercialized
through the inside, or through fan stores.
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An “Energie Fans Against Nazis!” (Energiefans gegen Nazis!) sticker is displayed in Paris, France, hundreds of
miles away from Cottbus.312

Overall, left-wing fans tend to be more against an outsider, capitalistic type of
consumerism, opposing the over-commercialization of football, such as corporations advertising
at football games. The policy-making bodies support left-wing fans’ actions to an extent, but the
policies and laws in Germany do not explicitly state support for anti-capitalism efforts in
football. Therefore, for left-wing football fans, like right-wing football fans, their rhetoric
remains in opposition to the mainstream. This is not to say that fans with a right-wing orientation
are not against the commercialization of the game, but left-wing fans are particularly interesting
to note because while Germany has many laws and policies that seem to support progressive,
more left-wing anti-discrimination efforts, some laws and policies still allow for actions that
many left-wing fans despise.
By analyzing fans’ cultural objects—like banners and stickers—one can see how fans are
able to interrupt mainstream society through objects with messages ranging from straightforward
to more ambiguous, the latter often requiring more of a background knowledge to understand.
Furthermore, because of codified anti-discrimination efforts in Germans laws and sport policies,
left-wing fans’ tend to be more “loud and proud” with their banners, while far-right fans will rely
on ambiguity and concealmeant to avoid incriminating themselves with illegal or socially taboo
words and actions. However, the rhetoric of fans on both sides of the political spectrum remains
fringe because German laws and policies do not necessarily cover all facets of left-wing
politics—including anti-capitalism efforts. Utilizing cultural objects allow fans to reap additional
benefits: rather than speaking their messages, fans are able to emulate various aesthetics that help
312
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them illustrate their message, avoid incrimination, unite under common themes, and display a
louder, clearer message.
Chapter 2: Clothing
English singer-songwriter and left-wing activist Billy Bragg’sencapsulates how political
movements can be commodified and participation in one can be “bought” through purchasing
objects in support of or specific to the movement like clothing: “So join the struggle while you
may. The revolution is just a T-shirt away.” This is perhaps one of the most commercialized areas
of football fan culture: one can easily buy team clothing—apolitical or politically-oriented—in
fan shops at the stadiums or online or even through more mainstream brands with hidden
political extremism-oriented symbols. For example, while the majority of the clothing for sale in
Babelsberg 03’s online shop is not political in nature, one can also easily purchase a shirt with
the message “Nazis out! Of the stadium” (Nazis raus! aus den Stadien) for fifteen Euros—even
in five different colors—or a sweater stating “LONSDALE LONDON AGAINST RACISM &
HATE” for 30 Euros, referring to the English brand Lonsdale.
Commercialization of clothing goes hand-in-hand with the inclusion of hidden political
symbols—especially right-wing symbols—because when more mainstream brands utilize the
illegal or taboo symbols, they often have to be hidden to dodge punishment from the
establishment. This is likely because these far-right commercialized brands maintain a strong
online presence and are monitored by the authorities and/or those on the left; therefore, both
far-right oriented fans wearing the symbols and non-football far-right brands need to game-play
to remain secretive and ambiguous.
Mainstream Far-Right Brands

Garner 112

Throughout the years, clothing brands and style have been important elements of
subcultures. For example, many skinheads have embraced a practical, working-class style by
wearing steel-toed boots and suspenders.313 As the subculture developed and fluctuated, clothing
brand—rather than primarily the actual items worn—became important. This meant that far-right
individuals commonly wearing a particular brand actually made that perhaps originally apolitical
brand politicized through association or helped these originally politically-oriented brands gain
traction and recognition.314 For example, as the style of parts of the (far-right) skins subculture
community changed to a more “sophisticated” look in the early 2000s, certain more suave brands
became more popular among the skins,315 particularly “brands that deploy coded far right
extremist symbols.”316 These outside politically-oriented brands not directly associated with
football teams or fans are most often far-right. But these brands’ brick and mortar stores
throughout Germany do not overtly express far-right statements; walking by these stores without
knowledge of the brand’s political association, one would likely see it as just another store.
Therefore, one of the less conspicuous aspects of political expression through clothing is not
through overt political expression, but rather by (known) association.
These far-right brands and the use of them were the inspiration for Miller-Idriss’s
research and concept of “game-playing” because of how those on the far-right use coded
symbols through these brands, which allow their wearers and creators to avoid punishment and
censorship by the establishment. Interestingly, the widespread commercialization of the
right-wing is not a new concept in Germany, or internationally. For example, in 1930s Germany,
vendors sold Nazi products—such as chocolate candies with swastikas—but Nazi party leaders
313
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found that it “cheapened the National Socialist ideology.”317 Eventually, these far-right symbols
displayed on these commercialized objects would not be the symbols in their raw, original form,
but would become less overt, more complex, and more coded, especially in post-WIII society as
Germany embraced Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung. In the 1980s, this right-wing
commercialization resurged during the 80s right-wing music scene, when low-budget and screen
printed cultural objects like pins and tee shirts were sold “with coded symbols and references to
far right ideology.”318 Interestingly, Miller-Idriss notes how this commercialization is unique to
Europe,319 calling attention to the irony of citizens from a continent that dealt with a fascist
dictatorship less than a hundred years ago finding unique ways to express their adoration of
far-right extremism.
Broadly speaking, utilizing clothing to disseminate information is not necessarily a
political tactic, but it is a well-known strategy that the far-right takes advantage of through these
brands. This is likely because, like banners and football itself, clothing is highly visible. For
example, the photo below shows an image from the popular clothing brand H&M with children
wearing sweaters with the message “THE FUTURE BELONGS TO US.” This is not necessarily
a politically-oriented message, but this photo shows how designers across brands will utilize
messages on clothing, even children’s clothing. Clothing might even be more visible than
banners because one can wear politically-oriented clothing far beyond the football stadium,
opening up the messages worn on clothing pieces to a wider audience than banners. Miller-Idriss
underscores this by pointing out how tee shirts and sweaters “act as billboards” and the consumer
serves as a “literal [embodiment] of nationalist messages.”320 Similarly, like football’s
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dichotomous function of entertainment and political organization, there is a dichotomous
function of clothing: one needs to wear clothes, so why not wear clothes and display political
views simultaneously?

The popular clothing brand H&M sells children’s clothes with messages on them, like these sweaters reading “THE
FUTURE BELONGS TO US.”321

Another reason clothing is such a commodified object among far-right football fans is
that wearing more expensive brands gives the subculturalists the opportunity to employ the
clothing as a “status symbol.”322 More expensive and higher quality clothes from some of these
companies highly differ from the working-class (skinhead) aesthetic that was originally
embraced by some of the far-right football fans, underscoring the flux of politically-oriented
subcultures' aesthetics. In a similar vein, brands also see the economic benefit of tailoring their
clothes to specific groups, especially groups which rely on style as a part of their collective
321
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identity; these brands know that appealing to the far-right can be a lucrative endeavor, especially
if they help wearers express taboo political views in ways that allow them to avoid prosecution.
Several notable far-right brands in Germany and across Europe worn by far-right football
fans include the following:
● Thor Steinar: This brand refers to a Norse god and the misspelled name of a Nazi
general—Felix Martin Julius Steiner—in its name.323 Thor Steinar sells an expensive,
suave, and comprehensive line for men and women, from jeans to sweatshirts to belts.324
The brand has also expanded internationally, even with a United States branch, Dortrix.
Like the following brands, Thor Steinar caters to “micro-cultures”325 on the far-right
political spectrum—such as the hooligans—and its website mirrors that of apolitical
sophisticated clothing brands.326
● Erik and Sons: Like Thor Steinar, this brand also sells a broad high-class range of
clothing, but at a slightly lower price. Erik and Sons also refers to itself as a “Viking
brand,” and like many other far-right brands in Germany, plays on a Nordic aesthetic.
● Ansgar Aryan: This brand also sells a wide-range of clothes that are commonly worn by
neo-Nazis. Ansgar Aryan’s “pro-Identitär” website states that wearing the brand in public
is “an aesthetic-political act” against multiculturalism, the “actionless” middle-class, and
“visionless pessimists.”327 At the end of their mission statement, the brand states “yes to
heroism.” The latter shows how these brands prey on a “heroism” trope—namely, that
those on the far-right need to “save” their country from multiculturalism.
323
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● Fourth Time and Label 23 Boxing Connection: These brands are a “crossover market”
that are worn by youth in various far-right sport subcultures, from the football hooligans
to those in martial arts subcultures. This shows a clear intersection between sports,
athletic clothing, and a far-right political orientation.
● Ostfront-Versand: This brand sells more overt “white supremacist merchandise” online.328
Some of these items include clothes referring to various German cities, with the city
name being written in a Fraktur-like font.329 Ostfront-Versand is an example of the range
of far-right subcultures’ overtness: some use more coded symbols, while some are more
conspicuous about their political-orientation.
Although these brands have some differences in political overtness and aesthetic, the
brands tend to employ common themes. For example, a commonly employed theme for these
far-right brands tends to be hypermasculinity, with many models for these brands being adorned
with (over the top) muscles, tattoos, and piercings.330 This hypermasculinity also preys on the
ideas of dissent and fraternity331—ideas frequently employed by the far-right—because the
brands often encourage the wearers to be both separate from the establishment and unified with
other “tough” men through their self-imposed marginalization. Miller-Idriss also points out that
despite many of these far-right brands selling clothing for women too, more of the far-right
coded symbols are seen on men’s clothing,332 so it is often primarily the men’s clothing that
encourages and reflects being far-right and anti-establishment.
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A stoic Thor Steinar model appears quite muscular, preying on a hypermasculine aesthetic.333

Far-right commercialized brands often complement hypermasculinity with a Nordic
aesthetic, such as through the employment of Viking imagery. Many of the models for these
brands, for example, emulate a Viking-look, with beards, longer hair, a stoic, warrior-like facial
expression, and muscles, which are overall considerably and stereotypically masculine traits.
Furthermore, many of these brands will utilize actual Nordic symbols, even selling clothing
items with Nordic flags and names, like the name “Thor” in Thor Steinar. Similarly, “Erik” in
Erik and Sons—the brand which refers to itself verbatim as a “Viking Brand”—is the Nordic
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spelling of the German name “Erich.” Generally, many of these brands are conspicuous about
their desire to employ Nordic or Viking imagery.

A hat costing 24.90 euros from Erik and Sons features a Danish flag.334

Miller-Idriss postulates several reasons for these far-right brands utilizing Nordic
imagery. Foremost, these brands prey on the (white) “fantasy of nordic heritage”—a fantasy
which the far-right associates with traits like purity, beauty, and integrity, making the utilization
of the historic Nordic portrayal emulate a simpler, purer past that offers solace in a troubled,
contemporary world. 335 This is a similar tactic as when those on the right employ a Fraktur(-like)
font to reference a more traditional and perhaps what in their eyes is a “simpler and purer”
Germany. A more specific implication of these brands’ Viking and Nordic imagery includes
promoting a sense of nationalism by supporting the fantasy of an “aspirational nationhood” or
“nation that never existed but that is nonetheless aspired to,”336 additionally evoking a sense of
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loss by encouraging the “preservation, survival, resurrection, or rebirth of [this] particular kind of
nation.”337
This nationalism goes hand-in-hand with promoting whiteness. Namely, people from the
Nordic countries—Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland—tend to be from a North
Germanic ethnic group, with the vast majority of the people from these countries being white.
Supporting Nordic imagery alludes to supporting whiteness. These brands also touch on to
Germany’s colonial and Nazi history by promting messages that refer to loyalty to one’s
homeland. In a similar vein, one can also see the idea of xenophobia being promoted, which
encompasses islamophobic and antisemitic ideas. Phalanx Europa, for example, states that it is a
brand that “embraces the tradition and heritage of [the European] continent” (das sich der
Tradition und dem Erbe unseres Kontinents). These traits arguably fall under an umbrella
regarding belonging; the Nordic ideas especially promote this because they perpetuate the idea of
one belonging to a particular culture or ethnic group.
Similarly, wearing clothes from the same brand promotes the collective identity of the fan
subculture because it can strengthen in-group bonding and identification, showing how fashion
acts as a collective behavior, or a “social ritual” and a “type of common thought and action
which depends upon certain currents of ideas and actions running through a group.”338 The
symbols on the clothes themselves also promote the idea of in-group versus out-group.339 That is,
many of these clothing objects contain symbols and messages that promote an opposition to the
out group through “exclusionary ideology,” like xenophobic symbols against Muslims.340
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These brands often also display symbols relating to death and violence, alluding to deaths
of individuals or the “death” of a society or culture.341 These symbols also can cause viewers to
feel anxiety because they confront death head-on,342 acting as a distracting and sometimes
distressing aesthetic for viewers. Conversely, “performative strategy” can evoke an image of
fearlessness of death from the wearer.343 In conjunction with Nordic imagery, death imagery also
alludes to nationalism, as it can “crystallize a kind of ‘magical thinking’ about the death (or
potential death) of a blood-based ancestral group.”344
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A muscular model dons an aggressive graphic jacket from the far-right clothing brand Yakuza reading “NO
MERCY, NO REGRET ONLY VIOLENCE.” 345

Miller-Idriss argues far-right brands commercializing and/or creating symbols which prey
on various aesthetics from Nordic to death-related can have various implications. For one, the
345
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symbols can serve as a means of ideological recruitment.346 That is, it can be easier for young
people to wear these symbols referring to far-right extremist content without understanding the
original meanings behind the brands and symbols.347 Wearing these brands and symbols can also
serve as a more discreet signal that one is part of a subculture and willing to act out for their
in-group, further strengthening the far-right football subculture’s collective identity outside of the
stadium. Miller-Idriss quotes twenty-two-year old construction worker Timo who explains this
idea: “Lots of people wear [such symbols] on a T-shirt so that it can be seen. So that you can see,
OK, good, they are maybe a little gewaltbereit [ready to be violent].”348 Timo’s quote illustrates
how one can easily send out a strong image by donning a particular symbol. This reflects how
politically-oriented football fans—especially those on the right—can choose a specific type of
visibility: they want to be seen by others in their in-group but avoid being spotted by the
establishment.
Using discreet symbols that reference far-right themes—as Miller-Idriss writes—means
that wearers “game-play” with bans, as consumers are often aware of the legal bans on symbols
and phrases associated with them.349 Namely, those wearing these brands will change their
“codes and their display to navigate bans.”350 For example, some brands will combine various
banned symbols to produce a new symbol that essentially is allowed because it no longer refers
to a banned organization.351 Therefore, banning policies can actually backfire, causing those
being censored to continue this “game-playing” by constantly modifying their coded symbols.
They are then utilizing the same aspects of circumventing banning policies that made the coded
346
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symbols originally appealing.352 For example, over time, Thor Steinar began to embrace a more
Nordic aesthetic in its brand,353 which serves as a more minor example of the broad idea that
subcultures and their aesthetics can fluctuate to game-play. Because of the powerful ambiguity of
many symbols, it is likely that they will continue to be missed by the vetting government bodies,
avoiding legal repercussions.
Commercialization of clothing also occurs with left-wing fans’ clothing, but often in a
dissimilar way. Namely, like the left-wing banners, left-wing commercialized clothing is often
also “loud and proud,” oftening not requiring such a degree of game-playing as the far-right. For
example, with a caption reading “ST. PAULI ANTIFASCIST” the shirt below from St. Pauli’s
fan store makes the intersection of St. Pauli and antifascism unmistakable.

A shirt from St. Pauli’s fan store reads “ST. PAULI ANTIFASCIST” and features the antifascist symbol of a black
and red flag, with the black flag displaying St. Pauli’s Totenkopf symbol.

Furthermore, much of the commercialized far-left clothing is made from the inside, such
as by the fans, or those openly involved in it. For example, many of these clothes are sold by the
352
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teams’ fanladens. However, there are also outside stores that sell left-wing clothes, like the
online store “No Borders,” which sells clothing at the intersection of football and politics. The
fact that the football teams’ official fan stores sell far-left clothing is a key difference between
far-left and far-right fans’ commercialized clothing. Since far-left teams and fans can sell their
own clothing in fan stores, the profits from their politically-oriented clothes can go back to
supporting the far-left efforts of the teams and fans by
giving them the financial opportunity to continue to
develop their left-wing cultural objects. On the other
hand, far-right clothing brands like Thor Steinar
primarily keep the revenue for themselves, so this
money does not go back to supporting the far-right
football fan subculture to the same extent. For
example, at one point, Thor Steinar was “sold to a
conglomerate based in Dubai,” reflecting profits even going to those outside of Germany.354
However, some brands have financially supported far-right efforts, instead of only taking
financial advantage of them. For instance, Erik and Sons has sponsored far-right gatherings.355
But again, the destination of profits from these brands is often not directly towards supporting
the politically-oriented subculture. Because of Germany’s anti-discriminations laws and policies,
it would not be possible for the teams to officially sell far-right clothing, so outside sources have
to do it.
While loud and proud messages on clothing are more common on left-wing
commercialized clothing and the selling tactics of the two differ, one can see how left-wing
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clothing relies on a use of symbols similar to that of right-wing commercialized clothing. For
example, the black shirt with the rainbow skull seen below relies on the use of the Totenkopf to
represent the larger message of being associated with St. Pauli’s far-left fan subculture. Like
far-right clothing, wearing clothes with left-wing associated symbols can act as a signal to others
that one is associated with a far-left culture. Some symbols—like the Totenkopf symbol—also
require politically-oriented insider knowledge to understand the political connotations of the
symbol. Therefore, symbols like the Totenkopf can serve as a signal to others in or associated
with the far-left football fan culture specifically. When one with insider knowledge notices that
someone is wearing the Totenkopf symbol, they can know that the wearer is another far-left ally.
Far-left clothing also especially takes advantage of layering ideological causes through
design. For example, on the tee shirt below, one can see a layering of political messages. The
Totenkopf symbol alone could represent St. Pauli’s left-wing beliefs, but the rainbow color of the
Totenkopf specifically accentuates a support for the LGBT community. Here, a symbol can serve
as an additional signal—rather than the primary signal—because one can see that the wearer
supports the LGBT community without knowledge of the left-wing community that the
Totenkopf symbol represents.
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A tee shirt from St. Pauli’s fan store features a rainbow Totenkopf symbol.

The other shirt below from St. Pauli’s fan store also shows a layering of political
messages—referring to fighting homophobia, fascism, sexism, and racism—but in this case,
without overt references to the actual football team. Furthermore, this shirt is a prime example of
the loud and proud quality many left-wing clothing pieces have, with the message of the shirt
requiring little thinking from the viewer. That is, the shirt clearly states the wearer’s broad
disdain for discrimination.
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A shirt from St. Paul’s fan store states “NO PLACE FOR HOMOPHOBIA FASCISM SEXISM RACISM.”

Overall, far-left commercialized clothing is similar to far-right commercialized clothing
in that it can serve as a signal to others in the subculture or associated with the
subculture—especially when specific symbols are used—but the far-left has the advantage that
they do not constantly have to game-play when it comes to their commercialized clothing. The
implication of the latter is that far-left fans can utilize more overt, loud and proud messages, in
addition to employing more insider commercialization.
Appropriating History and Historical Ignorance
The far-right’s appropriation of Nordic symbols is a specific example of the far-right’s
“weaponization” of the (European) Middle Ages; appropriating historical symbols alluding to
Europe’s history is a tactic used by the far-right throughout western countries. For example, the
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far-right attendees of the infamous United the Right rally—when various far-right groups
gathered in Charlottesville,Virginia to oppose the removal of a Robert E. Lee statue from a
Charlottesville park—displayed Nordic symbols, such as a Nordic rune symbol.356 Similarly, the
far-right terrorist who attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019 used
weapons that were inscribed with messages referencing the Crusades, like the Battle of Lepanto
and Acre. 357 These examples—in addition to the use of the aforementioned use of Fraktur
font—display a historical ignorance; many of those on the far-right displaying these historical
symbols have limited knowledge of their contexts and uses, showing a tactic of picking and
choosing which history to acknowledge.
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A Nordic rune symbol —which was also appropriated and displayed by the Nazis—is displayed on a flag at the
Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville.358

One of the implications of right-wing extremists employing medieval symbols includes
Medieval Studies academics having to grapple with whether their field has a white supremacy
problem.359 Some believe that the study of Medieval Studies—and fascination with certain parts
of European history as a whole—can contribute to a romantic nationalism for “an idealized past
populated by Anglo-Saxons,” 360 paralleling the reasons that the far-right employ Fraktur, for
example. Although some Medieval Studies scholars have far from agreed over whether this is
true and how to address it, some of these scholars have actively taken action to address the issue
when after the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, over two dozen scholarly groups—such as
358
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the Medieval Academy—put out a statement to condemn the “fantasy of a pure, white Europe
that bears no relationship to reality.”361 Other academic disciplines are making similar moves to
address the possibility of their European -oriented discipline being appropriated and twisted by
white supremacists. For example, many German studies scholars are making commitments to
acknowledge the atrocities of the Holocaust and study non-white aspects of German culture and
history, such as byfocusing on the experiences of afro-Germans and discussing the genocides
Germany committed against the Herero and Namaqua people in Africa decades before the
Holocaust. By working towards a more inclusive and accurate teaching of these disciplines,
academics are attempting to address white supremacists appropriating the history that they study.
Overall, academics attempting to keep the far-right out points toward the fact that these majority
white European countries are more than how the far-right chooses to see them, that many of
these countries have and still do commit small- or large-scale discriminatory and/or violent acts
towards people of color and other marginalized groups, and that many cultural and academic
successes come from non-Western European countries and/or were appropriated by Western
European countries. By doing so, academics are trying to reclaim what the far-right has
appropriated through cultural objects.
Wearing Illegal or Extreme Symbols
The European pride that is emulated through the commercialized brands worn by
far-right football fans is especially taboo in Germany because of Germany’s
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung efforts. Again, wearing far-right, nationalistic, white
pride-related items carries a certain weight in the country because of Germany’s history of
fascism. One of the more immediate implications of Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung is
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that these symbols and brands—which toe the “line of legality in Germany”362—are banned or
limited on various levels. As a reminder, 86a of the German Criminal Code forbids the use of
speech, signs, and symbols that are associated with organizations considered to be against the
constitution, including National Socialist organizations. A Hitler salute, for example, would be
an arrestable offense under article 86a. However, wearing a hat from Erik and Sons with
Norwegian flag arguably lacks a clear connection with a banned organization albeit sharing
connotations—namely white supremacist ones—with these organizations. This is a clear
example of how cultural objects allow those on the far-right to game-play by being far-right, but
not always clearly far-right.
One of the ways the state can monitor new brands in Germany is when they are
registering for a patent through the German Patent and Brand Office (Deutsches Patent- und
Markenamt).363 This means that the establishment must often be aware of the brand to an extent,
making it hard for new brands to completely dodge the authorities. The Office for the Protection
of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) in Brandenburg, for example, states that the Thor Steinar
brand can act as a “scene-typical badge of recognition and demarcation,” making it clear that the
state is sometimes even aware of the political associations of these brands.364 In a similar vein,
several football stadiums have banned these brands. For example, Tennis Borussia Berlin, Hertha
BSC Berlin, Werder Bremen, Borussia Dortmund, and Hamburger SV have banned wearing the
Thor Steinar brand in their stadium. Furthermore, visitors and employees of the Bundestag
cannot wear Thor Steinar and the brand is also commonly banned in other public sector
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buildings, schools, and stadiums.365 This underscores that although these brands are harder to
spot, far-left fans and the mainstream recognize them to an extent.
The majority of the existing bans related to this commercialized far-right clothing do not
necessarily relate to the brand, but the symbols that they deploy. The Patent Office approves
applications sent to them after determining that the applications are not copying other brands, but
also that the application does not include illegal content.366 These are not the only ways that an
application can be rejected: the Patent Office can additionally reject applications on moral
grounds (Verstoß gegen die guten Sitten), a reason commonly used with pornographic and clearly
right-wing extremist content.367
In regards to the latter, extremist content is not always caught by the Patent Office,
highlighting how the far-right’s game-playing can be successful. For example, Miller-Idriss
refers to the brand Consdaple, who originally passed their submitted review because those
reviewing the application did not at first catch the initials of the Nazi Party—NSDAP—in
“Consdaple.”368 The Consdaple clothing is allowed to continue to be produced, but without the
protected brand status (Marketschutz).369 Brands will find creative ways to get around bans to
still display the symbols and messages that they want to show. Similarly, Thor Steinar originally
combined two banned symbols, creating a new symbol for their brand that parallels a Swastika.
Like Consdaple, the Thor Steinar symbol is allowed to continue to be produced because courts
overturned bans on the symbol, relying on a “semiotic argument” to defend it.370 These examples
show how in recent years, the courts in Germany have sided with defendants who argue for their
right to use these right-wing symbols, underscoring that the German establishment often has
365
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policies and laws to avoid the growth of fascism, but still at times prioritizes free speech, even if
it can be interpreted as a type of fascist and hate speech. This also highlights the role and impact
of association rather than overtness; in order to ban a symbol, phrase, or action, the courts rely on
symbols associating with banned organizations.371 The process is often not black-and-white nor
is it predictable.
Outside of the realm of commercialized clothing, another commonality between far-left
and far-right clothes is that both will at times dress primarily in black, likely because the fans are
utilizing the black bloc tactic. This is a protest tactic often used to disguise their identity; it
involves wearing all black clothing, as well as sunglasses, ski masks, and helmets, among other
clothing items. At protests, the black bloc tactic can make it harder to spot and identify
individual protestors, making it easier to avoid police and being doxxed. Because of illegal or
rambunctious actions at and outside of the stadium, deindividuation through wearing all black
can have similar benefits for football fans. In addition to increasing fan unity and in-group
identification, wearing all black makes it easier for fans to express political messages that might
be considered extreme, taboo, or illegal. So even if left-wing fans are not necessarily doing
illegal actions, the black bloc tactic can prove beneficial for fans to avoid being doxxed for
fringe rhetoric and symbols, including those that are specifically used to antagonize right-wing
fans. Similarly, wearing team colors—for both the left and right—can act as a signal to other fans
and increase deindividuation and in-group bonding.
Furthermore, from a psychological perspective, the deindividuation among the
individuals in the black bloc also likely reduces inhibition because of the anonymity that the
deployment of the black bloc tactic can provide. Wearing balaclavas, masks, face coverings, and
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matching clothes can perpetuate violence and other dangerous behavior one would normally not
do if their identity was instead being shown.

Fans at a Babelsberg 03 game wear (mostly) all black, emulating the black bloc protest tactic.372

Wearing symbols or messages that are extreme or toe the line of what is legal can also
cause a quick interception from authorities. Occasionally, fans’ clothes and belongings will be
searched as they enter games, with police focusing on fans of teams with politically-oriented
subcultures, sometimes resulting in “aggressive” strip searches.373 For example, Montague
mentions how the police likely became interested in searching Cottbus fans during a specific
instance because of their “FCK CPS” (fuck cops) bags, which likely served as a signal to the
authorities that these fans might be planning violent and/or illegal activities.374 This highlights a
consequence of not game-playing and instead using more in-your-face anti-establishment
messages, which can result in monitoring from the authorities. A message does not necessarily
372
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need to be illegal to prompt a response from the authorities; fans—who on the left and right are
united by an ACAB-orientation—can strategically be more loud and proud with certain
anti-establishment messages, knowing that they are (for the most part) allowed because of one’s
legally-guaranteed freedom of expression.375
Satirical Responses
Founded by SDP politician Mathias Brodkorb in 2008, Storch Heinar is an antifascist
brand that parodies Thor Steinar. The brand was launched as a part of Endstation Rechts, which
is located in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Germany and fights right-wing extremism.376
Thor Steinar actually tried to bring the parody label to court on the claim that the parody brand
damages its image, but the case was dismissed due to lack of similarity between the brands, with
the courts claiming that viewers would not get Storch Heinar and Thor Steinar mistaken for one
another.377 It was also claimed that Brodkorb's freedom of speech and expression needed to be
protected since the brand was not-for-profit, but rather for political purposes.378
Many of Storch Heinar's products feature a simply drawn, feeble, and arguably comedic
stork directly contrasting with the strong, masculine, and stoic image that Thor Steinar strives to
portray. For example, the first image below (left) shows what seems to be Thor Steinar's label
(right), but with a closer look is actually the frail stork.
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But not all of the Storch Heinar products are poking fun at right-wing extremism. For
example, in some left-wing circles, a symbol showing a person kicking another person with a
circle accompanied by the saying “GOOD NIGHT WHITE PRIDE” as seen below (left) is
commonly adorned on buttons, stickers, or tee shirts. The Storch Heinar symbol below parodies
this symbol, by similarly featuring a person inside a circle, but he is throwing a snowball at a
snowman within the saying “GOOD NIGHT WHITE SPLENDOR” (GUTE NACHT WEISSE
PRACHT). While the vast majority of Storch Heinar merchandise is making fun of Nazi or
neo-Nazi imagery, it is possible that Brodkorb making fun of not just right-wing extremism, but
political extremism broadly, perhaps showing how the mainstream does not always take those on
the left and right seriously.
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382

Additionally, the Storch Heinar brand shows that while a lot of the politically-oriented
clothing worn by far-left and far-right football fan subcultures requires an extent of insider
knowledge to be aware of the political connotation of the messages and symbols on the clothing,
there is not always complete departure from the establishment; since Brodkorb is a German
politician, he is arguably the epitome of “establishment.”
Another example of parodied responses through clothing is Phalanx Europa’s sweatshirt
blow reading “STILL NOT [LOVE]ING ANTIFA!” This sweatshirt is poking fun at the far-left
commonly used symbol “STILL NOT [LOVE]ING POLICE!” on the right. As aforementioned,
both sides tend to be ACAB-oriented, but this design is specifically associated with the left. This
underscores that actual messages accompanied with symbols—although often the most
straightforward part of the display—are not necessarily the more important part of the display:
design also has important implications. Parodying the other side through clothing also highlights
the specific route of communication between the left and right because through parodying,
brands show that they know the designs and messages used by the other side.
381
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383

384

Left is a sweater from the far-right clothing brand Phalanx Europa reading “STILL NOT LOVING
ANTIFA!”, poking fun at the commonly deployed left-wing message “STILL NOT LOVING POLICE!”, seen on an
ultras Sankt Pauli banner in the right image.

Chapter 3: Chants and Songs
In April 2017, FC Energie Cottbus fans drove over an hour north to attend the SV
Babelsberg 03 vs. FC Energie Cottbus game.385 Throughout the match, Cottbus
fans—accompanied by some Chemnitz fans—held up their arms to do Nazi salutes, shot rockets
and flares towards Babelsberg fans, and chanted phrases like “Work makes you free, Babelsberg
03” (Arbeit macht frei, Babelsberg 03) to agitate the strongly far-left Babelsberg fans.386 The
latter was a phrase hovering over Auschwitz and several other concentration camps.
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A WORK MAKES YOU FREE ( ARBEIT MACHT FREI) sign over the concentration camp Auschwitz. 387

When masked hooligans from the Cottbus side attempted to approach the Babelsberg
fans, Babelsberg fans chanted “Nazi pigs out!” (Nazischweine raus!). 19 criminal proceedings
followed the match.388 Babelsberg fans were fined about 7,000 euros by their regional football
association (NOFV) for their side’s other crowd behavior and use of pyrotechnics. Cottbus fans
were fined about 10,000 euros for their crowd behavior at the Babelsberg game and two
additional games. However, in the court verdict, Babelsberg chants were the only ones
mentioned. Cottbus fans’ actions were eventually added to the verdict when the DFB intervened,
but Cottbus’s punishment was even reduced from 10,000 euros to 6,000 after they appealed. On
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moral grounds, Babelsberg decided to risk insolvency and refused to pay the fine for their fans’
behaviors. What seemed to have started off as a normal football game would end up receiving
international attention and ignite a fire in Babelsberg 03 fans to address the football association
seemingly ignoring right-wing extremism in football. This was the game that started
Babelsberg’s “Nazis out! Of the Stadium” (Nazis Raus! aus den Stadien) movement.389
Looking at the infamous Babelsberg vs. Cottbus game highlights several key ideas. For
one, although the sport policy-making bodies seem to be highly for preventing and stopping
right-wing extremism, this is not always the case. This is also seen with the German courts siding
at times with right-wing extremists to protect their freedom of speech rights. In this instance, the
regional football association not only did not include the Nazi chants and far-right symbols in the
verdict, but punished the side performing anti-Nazi actions. The DFB arguably remedied the
situation for Babelsberg to an extent, but again, they still relaxed Cottbus’s inital punishment. In
addition to highlighting the fact that the sport policy making bodies are not inherently supporting
progressive, antifascist efforts, the Babelsberg vs. Cottbus game highlights the power and impact
of chants. This phenomena is not new: historically, football stadiums have served as a means of
expressing “oblique” political frustration. For example, East Germans expressed their
frustrations with the East German regime through football chants decades ago.390 This chapter
will further explore how fans have contemporarily utilized this practice at football games, from
simple, monotonous, three-line chants to more complex, melodious songs accompanied by
complex choreo.
Utilizing Mainstream Music
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Before, during, and after games, stadiums will frequently blast well-known songs, often
chosen by fans. For example, St. Pauli opens its home games with AC/DC’s “Hell’s Bells” and
plays Blur’s “Song 2” after every home goal. These songs tend to be high energy songs—or
songs that “pump up” the crowd—and have not only “catchy” lyrics, but also a catchy melody.
Blur's “Song 2,” for example, starts with a simple, softer drum beat, adds on a similarly soft
guitar riff before breaking out into a loud chorus, repeating a sung “woohoo!” “Hell’s Bells”
features a melodious guitar riff, and the singer of the song repeats the phrase “Hell’s Bells”
throughout the chorus. Since there is a good chance that fans at the game know the words or
melody to these familiar and repetitive songs, fans can dance and sing with one another to the
song. Furthermore, because of their simplicity, songs like “Hell’s Bells” and “Song 2” are
arguably catchy and easy for fans of various backgrounds to dance and sing along to; even if one
does not speak English, phrases and sounds like “woohoo” and “Hell’s Bells” do not require a
strong grasp of the English language to repeat.
The unity that results from fans singing and dancing together—especially in conjunction
with wearing similar clothing—can be analyzed from a psychological standpoint. Studies have
shown that music-associated spontaneous, unprompted group movements can progress to
synchronized movement and synchronized respiratory control rhythms, with this synchronization
reflecting one’s empathy for their surroundings.391 This synchronization can even be a natural
physiological response that plays on innate human mechanisms; namely, sometimes
synchronization cannot be avoided, and one’s movement will unintentionally mirror that of
others.392 Even if one is not part of the football fan subculture, attendees can act as a part of the
391
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fan unit by participating in the physical responses to the music, reflecting how the subculture and
participation in it is a contemporary response to humans’ highly social and empathetic nature.
Song lyrics themselves can also reflect the unity that music perpetuates for fans. For
instance, “You’ll Never Walk Alone” is a British song from 1945 that is well-loved not only by
many German football fans, but by fans around the world. Liverpool Football Club's fans began
to play the song at their games, and fans from German teams like Dortmund and St. Pauli later
followed the tradition. Promoting fans’ solidarity and unity with one another, the song’s lyrics
focus on staying together through trials and tribulations:

“When you walk through a storm
Hold your head up high
And don't be afraid of the dark
At the end of the storm
There's a golden sky
And the sweet silver song of the lark
Walk on through the wind
Walk on through the rain...
With hope in your heart
And you'll never walk alone...”

The lyrics of the song reflect politically-oriented fans’ self-reflection of the
challenges—or “storms”—that they go through. From dealing with antagonistic fans on the other
side of the political spectrum to experiencing increased vetting from authorities, fans
acknowledge the shared identity and values of their subculture, reminding each other and
themselves through singing the song’s lyrics that they do not have to go through these challenges
alone.
Music also helps accentuate political solidarity outside of the fan scene. For example,
there is an intersection of politically-oriented football fans and the more politically-based music
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scene, which attracts people from outside of the football subculture. This is interesting to look at
because there has long been an association between politically-oriented subcultures and the
politically-oriented music scenes. For example, the anti-establishment punk scene in the GDR
started as a music scene—through which the punks channeled their rebellion by listening to
anti-establishment bands—and the skinheads have strongly associated with the right-wing music
scene since the 1980s. In regards to the contemporary intersection of more mainstream
(politically-oriented) bands and politically-oriented football fans, some (left-wing) bands around
the world like Gaslight Anthem, Anti-Flag, and Pateón Rococó have publicly worn St. Pauli’s
Totenkopf symbol. Extremely well-known German bands like Fettes Brot and Die Ärzte also
identify as St. Pauli fans. Sometimes these bands will even perform charity concerts for the
teams. The intersection of more mainstream bands and the politically-oriented football
subcultures can boost the visibility of fans, and therefore, their politically-oriented messages.
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The lead singer of the American band Anti-Flag —Justin Sane—wears a FC St. Pauli shirt.393

The intersection between the politically-oriented fan subcultures and the music scene has
several benefits for the fan culture. For one, having well-known bands support the team and fans
provides the opportunity for charity concerts, and therefore, positive publicity. Positive publicity
is particularly beneficial because it combats negative publicity from the media, which often
focuses on fans' violence—which is sometimes blown out of proportion—and contributes to
negative stereotypes about the fan culture. Like football, concerts are also highly visible: that is,
they are covered by the media, preserved on platforms like YouTube, and are often shown on
393
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livestream to viewers around the world, easily disseminating the ideologies of the fans at charity
concerts.
Like the far-left, there is also an intersection between the far-right football fan subculture
and the far-right music scene. Hannes Ostendorf, for example, was one of the hooligans from
Werder Bremen's hooligan and neo-Nazi punk scenes, connected to Bremen's oldest hooligan
group, Standard Bremen, sometimes abbreviated as Standard 88, a coded phrase for “Hail Hitler”
(Heil Hitler).394 Ostendorf was the founder and lead singer of the extreme-right punk band
Kategorie C, which released an album “glorifying the far right as well as the hooligan terrace
culture” right before the 1998 France World Cup, reminding officials of the “strength and reach”
of German hooligans.395 The band’s name alludes to how police refer to football fans:
● Categorie A: “harmless, ultras who flew banners and flags”
● Categorie B: “those who let pyro and fireworks off in the stadium”
● Categorie C: “those who were involved in the worst of the violence”396
The band’s name “Kategorie C” highlights the intersection of the far-right and violence in
German football, and how hooligans actively attempt to emulate this violence, self-reflecting on
it. Again, this connects to the far-right’s “explicit predilection for violence.”397 At the
aforementioned HooGeSa rally, Kategorie C performed, writing and performing a song
specifically for the rally that utilized violent and aggressive lyrics that match the connotations of
the band’s name. The lyrics sung by the lead singer especially prey on fear, which again, the
far-right often uses to gain traction:
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“Today, they’re butchering sheep and cows,
tomorrow may be Christian children.
Hooligans against Salafists.
We don’t want a religious state.”

Hannes Ostendorf performs with his band Kategorie C at the far-right HooGeSa rally.398

Ostendorf sings about how Salafists are a danger to Christian children—likely
synonymous with white German children—but because of the far-right’s broad xenophobia
against migrants and refugees, Ostendorf is likely referring to Muslim migrants overall. The
strong sense of fear instilled in the song through Ostendorf singing about Salafists
“butchering...Christian children” and Germany becoming an (Islamic) religious state parallels the
AfD posters that have been hung around Germany reading “Stop Islamization!” (Islamisierung
stoppen) and “More safety for our women and daughters!” (Mehr Sicherheit für unsere Frauen
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und Töchter!). The far-right overall gain traction and bond with one another over their
xenophobic messages and fears. In this instance, the rally attendees—oxymoronically—dance to
and add further energy to their fears.
Chants and songs also show how easy it is to disseminate messages quickly to a broad
audience. Blasting politically-oriented music through speakers means that messages like
Ostendorf’s are practically unavoidable; hundreds of attendees were easily able to hear, sing
along with, and dance to far-right messages sung by Ostendorf. This is similar to the loud and
proud technique often seen with left-wing cultural objects, like banners. In this case, the
messages are proud and literally loud.

Hundreds of attendees dance to and sing with Kategorie C’s far-right songs at the Hooligans Against Salafists (HooGeSa)
399
rally.

Chants: Short, Simple, Powerful

399

VICE News, “Anti-Islamist Riots in Germany.”

Garner 148

Perhaps almost conversely, fans’ chants are often quite simple, and take advantage of
rhythm, rather than melody. Like songs, fans’ individualized chants are often passed down from
fan to fan within the subculture and preserved on platforms like YouTube and sites like
FansChants.com. While many of these chants do not have a political orientation, there is a strong
secondhand effect of these chants. That is, chanting together contributes to fans’ collective
identity, and therefore, political impact. For example, the chants below from Borussia and
Babelsberg fans do not have a direct political orientation:
Borussia:
“Heja BVB, Heja BVB, Heja Heja BVB Heja BVB, Heja BVB, Heja Heja BVB
Today we want to win. We are going for it, Borussia is playing really big today. Up to the
last man…”
(Heja BVB, Heja BVB, Heja Heja BVB Heja BVB, Heja BVB, BVB
Stürmen wollen wir das Tor. Ja das ist unsere Pflicht. Wir geben heut das Tempo an. Der
Gegner stört uns nicht…)400
Babelsberg:
“Oh Babelsberg zero three,
Shoot a goal for us,
In the Karl-Liebknecht Stadium,
For the North Curve”
(Oh Babelsberg null drei,
Schiesst ein Tor für uns,
Im Karl-Liebknecht-Stadion,
Für die Nordkurve)401
Although lacking clear politically-oriented messages, with lines like “we are going for
[the win]” and “shoot a goal for us,” the fans are in unison self-referencing themselves as a
400
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group, repeatedly claiming their solidarity with one another. Like songs, chants do not have to be
literally political to have a spillover effect on the politically-oriented actions of fans. As explored
in the previous section, chanting and moving together can increase fan unity, which can in turn
result in better group cohesion for expressing politically-oriented messages.
But of course, fans do at times have clearly politically-oriented chants, such as
Babelsberg’s “Nazi pigs out!” (Nazischweine raus!) chant. Since chants are a collective action,
when chants are disseminating extreme, taboo, or illegal messages, fans have the advantage that
it can be harder for people to spot who exactly is participating in the chant because one’s voice
becomes mixed with the others. One could also claim they were speaking, rather than
participating in the chant, and one can hide their mouth, such as by wearing a balaclava. When it
is challenging to spot the fans, it is harder to dox or prosecute them.
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It is challenging to know which individual Cottbus fans were chanting far-right chants at the infamous 2017
Babelsberg vs. Cottbus game for several reasons, including because Cottbus fans wore balaclavas, which obscured
fans’ faces. Here is a screencap of fans chanting Nazi-alluding chant, “ticks, gypsies, and Jews, Babelsberg 03.”402

While many of those on the far-right do seek to obscure their identity when participating
in illegal or socially taboo politically-oriented actions, again, some far-right fans will be loud and
proud about their views. For example, below one can see two men doing a Hitler salute, clearly
showing their identity, and chanting along with Cottbus’s far-right chants at the 2017 Cottbus vs.
Babelsberg game. This may seem quite precarious, but it is possible that fans’ can experience
collective bonding over their “loud and proud” risk. This again underscores how fan behavior is
at time’s counterintuitive and taboo, likely to catch the attention of outsider viewers. Confidently
breaking laws and taboos also helps the far-right strategically put out a message saying that even
if it is taboo to express neo-Nazi views in Germany, there is a community that could welcome
one with similar ideas. Openly white-supremacist fans use football’s publicity to act as a signal
for recruiting and bonding. From a psychological perspective, people are more likely to make
risky decisions when in a group, rather than when acting individually.403 This also helps explain
why some fans behave confidently when doing highly taboo or illegal actions.

402
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Some Cottbus fans proudly did Hitler salutes without obscuring their identities at the 2017 Cottbus vs. Babelsberg
game.404

While collective actions like chants likely increase in-group bonding, chants also provide
an easier route for participation in fans’ collective actions for attendees outside of the subculture.
At games, fans tend to stand together in a certain area. However, one does not need to be
standing exactly with the fans to participate in the chants since sound travels. Furthermore, since
chants are repetitive—often with the same lines or stanzas chanted over and over again—one
often does not need to originally know the lyrics to chant along at games because as the chants
continue, outsiders can “catch on” and eventually chant along. Like songs, chants also increase
fans’ solidarity with one another.
Layering Through Choreography
German ultras are united in “‘their fascination with choreography in the stadium,’”405
which as aforementioned, involves fans making a choreographed display of flags, banners, or
signs along with music or chants. German fans’ large and noteworthy use of
404
405
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choreography—which arguably acts as both a cultural practice and collective action—often
shows a clear layering of both cultural objects and collective actions. That is, choreo serves as a
showcase of fans’ banners, posters, flags, coordinated clothing, music, and performance,
ultimately highlighting the subcultures' reliance on aesthetic, detail-orientation, creativity, and
emphasis on a collective identity.

Borussia Dortmund fans are well-known for their choreo performances, like the one above which shows hundreds of
Dortmund fans working together to largely display the word “DORTMUND” using yellow flags.406

The photo below is a clear example of Babelsberg fans’ layering of cultural objects
through the collective action of choreo. Fans wear matching black clothes, some wave white
flags, others flags of various colors to make a rainbow, while some fans in the front hold up a
large display of two men kissing through a choreographed display accompanied by music. This

406
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display required teamwork from Babelsberg fans and reflected the creativity that goes into the
fan culture.

Babelsberg fans’ choreographed display —which won liga3-online’s “choreography of the month”—shows a
layering of fans’ cultural objects through a collective display.407

Overall, choreo often plays on the idea of “strength in numbers.” That is, the more fans
who participate in a unified choreography, the louder, and more significant the fan base appears,
reflecting resiliency and strength among the fans. Notably, Dortmund—who again, has the
largest standing terrace in European football—408has their renowned Yellow Wall, where
407
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thousands of Dortmund fans stand clad in yellow often performing choreos, which Montague
describes as “loud and intimidating”409 because of the sheer number and energy of Dortmund
fans. These large, layered, and politically-oriented displays are most often seen with left-wing
fans, as the far-right’s game-playing limits the extent to which they can put on such eye-catching
performances.

With coordinated clothing, politically-oriented and apolitical loud and proud banners, and loud music,
Borussia Dortmund’s Yellow Wall is the epitome of German fan culture.410

409
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In 2017, Borussia Dortmund was targeted by a terrorist attack that injured player Marc
Bartra.411 The choreography on the yellow wall helped the team and fans “to regain its fierce
composure of old” in the aftermath of the attack.412 Fans covered the stadium terrace in a yellow
and black cover, reemerging with war paint on their face and plastic ponchos to create the
Borussia emblem, while “You'll Never Walk Alone” and ultras beating drums played in the
background.413 The fans then revealed a banner during the performance that read “6:45 kick-off:
are you kidding? Fuck Uefa,”414 to complain about the match being rescheduled.415 From banners
to songs to a pre-planned performance, this instance reflects the layering of the football
subculture. Fans’ coordinated performances also especially highlight the creative work that can
go into the fan culture: the solidarity of fans is perpetuated through their cultural objects and
collective actions.
Conclusion
Political extremism can have dangerous implications, resulting in violence, unfounded
logic, limited free speech, and authoritarian leadership. After two politically extreme
dictatorships in the twentieth century, Germany knows this all too well. As a way of coping with
or working through their past, to avoid repeating it, and to better their reputation on the
international stage, Germany has implemented various laws and policies to prevent right-wing
extremism in particular, such as some of the strictest hate speech regulations in the west.
However, Germany has a clear and continued issue with right-wing extremism: violent
right-wing extremism in Germany highly exceeds that of other European countries.416
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In Germany, football has served as a highly viewable nexus point for the far-right to
gain traction for and disseminate hate fueled ideas; this has occasionally resulted in the
cultivation of a left-wing football subculture as defense. With growing (violent) political
extremism in Germany—especially on the far-right—and the commercialization of political
cultural objects, fringe ideas and networks become more accessible to everyday citizens. This
seems puzzling because the intention of subcultures—including far-left and far-right football
subcultures—is to diverge from the mainstream, or the establishment. But these subcultures have
almost a dichotomous operation: they can be both highly public and highly private.
In regards to their more overt operations, football subcultures on both the left and right
are commercialized to an extent. For example, much of the clothing on both the far-left and
far-right is available to the mainstream, either through football-associated fan shops or as is
especially the care for the far-right, through brands not officially associated with the teams. In
regards to fans’ deliberate openness, fans on both sides of the political spectrum will also often
hold up large banners and post stickers with anti-establishment messages both inside and outside
of the stadium, chant politically-oriented chants loudly for others to hear, and post their actions
on social media.
At the same time, fans—especially on the far-right—will display items with more coded
messages often requiring a use of insider knowledge to understand and perform their actions in
ways that promote deindividuation. One of the reasons that the subcultures will operate in this
more obscured way is because of the aforementioned laws and policies: hate speech restrictions
mean that politically-oriented football subcultures will find unique ways to avoid being restricted
by the establishment, resulting fans “game-playing” with their items, actions, and the laws and
policies in place. Overall, both subcultures and the mainstream fluctuate; subcultures continue to
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“game-play” to position themselves against the mainstream,417 often utilizing cultural objects and
collective actions to do so. The combination of text and design through cultural objects also
allows fans to put creative and at times more emphatic touches on their messages. For instance,
fans are able to put their messages in bold, brightly colored lettering that makes it more
challenging for game attendees to miss their messages. Furthermore, even when actions are
apolitical at face value—like when fans sing songs before games or after their team scores a
goal—actions like these can contribute to fans’ formation of a collective identity, which in turn
affects the fans’ ability to collectively fight for certain political goals.
Overall, fans’ communications are not black-and-white; cultural objects and collective
actions allow fans to pave routes of communication that lead to different destinations. I postulate
4 main routes of politically-oriented football fans’ expressions taking into account the more
public and more private sides of politically-oriented football fan culture:
Route 1: Football fans communicating with others in the subculture. For example,
fans will use social media or forums to organize creating banners with other fans to
display at games or to set up pre-game meeting points. Other examples of this first route
when fans are using symbols that are likely primarily understood by those in their
subculture. For example, Thor Steinar items and the meaning behind wearing these items
is not confined to far-right hooligans and the establishment is to an extent aware of the
political association of these brands, but wearing this clothing acts a signal to others in
the subculture, further strengthening their ability to identify one another and bond over
shared values. Concealed items from far-right fans often are communicated along this
route.

417
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Route 2: Football fans communicating with fans on the other side of the political
spectrum. One can especially see examples of this with the far-left; that is, a lot of fans
with a far-left orientation are utilizing cultural objects and collective actions to
antagonize far-right fans with the overall message that far-right sentiments are not
welcome. A prime example of this is when Babelsberg 03 fans chanted “Nazi pigs out”
(Nazischweine raus!) as a response to Cottbus fans doing Nazi salutes and chanting
phrases alluding to concentration camps. Overall, expressions in this category often
function as an action—one side expresses—and consequence—another side responds.
Route 3: Football fans communicating with a general audience. These expressions are
available to the mainstream, including to Germany’s legislative bodies, authorities, and
those with more conventional political attitudes. Examples of this include fans holding
large banners with bold and clear messages at games, such as ACAB- and
anti-commercialization-oriented messages. In this area, one oftens sees game-playing:
fans will sometimes want to be perceived, but not obvious to the extent that their fringe
rhetoric is censored. For instance, one can see a lot of far-right politically-oriented actions
and rhetoric coming from fans of lower-ranked teams—who are often less viewed than
higher-ranked teams—or fans will hide their identity by wearing similar clothes, covering
their faces, or hiding behind banners to still communicate to a general audience, but avoid
prosecution. Far-left clothing and banners often fall under this category, with fans’
cultural objects emulating a “loud and proud” message for others to see.
Route 4: Football fans’ attempted communications, which are intercepted—or
censored—before they reach viewers or a large number of viewers. Examples include
when fans’ are not allowed into the game, when their items are taken by authorities, or
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when the cameras at games are turned off, like when fans at a Borussia Mönchengladbach
vs. Leverkusen game shouted “Shit DFB!” over Monday night games and the cameras
were dismantled.418 It is important to note that right-wing messages are not the only ones
censored: left-wing fans’ anti-establishment messages can also be censored and result in
consequences for the fans, especially when they involve profanities, like in the
aforementioned example, or when symbols or messages are associated with left-wing
organizations deemed unconstitutional, like the hammer and sickle when it is used to
represent the Communist Party of Germany. It is also important to note that while overt
right-wing speech is at times censored or prosecuted—often more frequently than
left-wing speech—not all loud and proud right-wing rhetoric falls under this category;
freedom of speech rights mean that some right-wing speech is not prosecuted.

Fans’ various routes of communication show a clear, but occasionally disregarded idea:
censorship is not the key to preventing political extremism. By utilizing coded symbols and
418
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coded messages, the far-right especially is able to avoid the mainstream and other (far-left) fans
intercepting. Germany is an interesting case study for this idea because despite having some of
the strongest hate speech regulations in the world, hate speech is still prevalent—and
growing—in German society due to the far-right’s strategic communication. Namely, by using
banners, stickers, clothing items, and chants, politically-oriented football fans find creative ways
to still express their banned messages, taboo, and/or extreme messages. This is not to say that
hate speech regulations should not exist, but to point out the fact that even with strict regulations,
hate can still thrive in a society.
In her book, Miller-Idriss notes a lack of empirical research on the influence of bans on
the consumption of these coded symbols and commercial products,419 so more research is
needed, especially in-country. Researchers should specifically further analyze the dichotomy of
hate speech regulations: on one hand, they help prevent hate groups from gaining traction, but on
the other hand, they push dangerous speech underground, making it harder to spot and combat.
Germany is a special case that researchers should pay attention to, as social taboos resulting from
Vergangenheitsbewältigung/-aufarbeitung mean that far-right Germans have more motivation to
creatively game-play.
But the question remains: what is the key to addressing far-right extremism? One solution
is to positively reinforce initiative that address discrimination, which the policy bodies are
already utilizing in the domain of sport to an extent. For instance, recall the “Julius Hirsch Prize”
which is awarded to initiatives and individuals who show a strong commitment to
anti-discrimination efforts in the arena of football. Many of these rewarded initiatives are
left-wing initiatives, as the left often acts as a response to the far-right.
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Ultras fan group Schickeria receives the 2014 Juilius Hirsch prize.420

While football has served as a nexus point for spreading hate, it can also serve as a
means combating hate by promoting the United Nations’ key ways of decreasing potential for
radicalization and violent extremism, including empowering youth, providing a positive means
of socialization, and promoting communication with alienated groups and former extremists. For
example, Babelsberg 03’s Welcome United 03 initiative highlights the societal influence and
societal response of football. Welcome 03 was a team composed entirely of refugees; the team no
longer exists due to several issues and has been met with controversy—such as the idea that
players should be integrated into existing teams, rather being put on their own team—but the
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existence of the team has had positive implications. For one, it has given native Germans the
opportunity to frequently and positively socialize with refugees, from playing against them to
post-game barbeques. In former East Germany—which has some of the highest rates of
neo-Nazis and hate crimes against refugees—positively interacting with refugees can have
beneficial implications. The refugees who are seeking community inclusion are benefited, and
East Germans can get to know the refugees on a personal level, and therefore counteract
stereotypes that might be prevalent in East German cities especially. Furthermore, initiatives like
Welcome 03 can encourage positive civic engagement, including for those who do not have
voting rights: being a fan means that one can participate in decision making that affects how
one’s area is represented, and being a player means playing to represent one's municipality or
country. Overall, positive social interactions through initiatives such as Welcome 03 can
challenge right-wing extremism. This highlights that when done purposefully, football can be
used to address xenophobia and discrimination by taking advantage of opportunities for positive
change.
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Welcome 03 players—who are refugees from around the world—gather together on the field during a game.421

As explored in the introduction, the German establishment does to an extent support
political de-radicalization through football. For example, the aforementioned “Integrated
approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity” discusses ways that
grassroots sport initiatives can address radicalization.422 The research shows that it would be
beneficial for Germany to continue initiatives through football that serve the purpose of helping
integrate refugees and migrants. Additionally, Germany could focus more on football initiatives
that provide a positive social environment for those who are at risk of becoming political
421
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extremists, particularly youth in lower income areas, areas with less opportunities, and/or in
areas known to have strong far-right support. It is extremely vital that the powers at hand take
advantage of social opportunities innately provided by sport because those who are ostracized
are more at risk of illogical beliefs and becoming radicalized.423 Creative, immediate,
research-driven solutions that appeal to the youth are needed for Germany to truly embrace
Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung.
This research fills several gaps in the literature by looking at football subcultures on the
left and right, legislation, and why fan behavior is important to look at through the lens of the
unique German-context. Previous research has lacked such a broad analysis in the domain of
football. For example, Miller-Idriss’s work does not look at football nor the left-wing to such an
extent; her research on “game-playing,” however, provides a vital groundwork for understanding
politically-oriented subcultures in various domains. Taking Miller-Idriss’s work and applying it
to football is essential because of football’s high visibility, role as a national pastime in Germany,
and the opportunity for football to address the problem of far-right extremism, rather than
perpetuate it. Other research has also looked at primarily right-wing fans, but this thesis has
sought to serve as a reminder that both the left- and right- are often anti-establishment through a
common anti-police, anti-commercialization-orientation. This is important to regard because
while at face value the German establishment may seem more left-wing, there are still political
subcultures that wish to be and stay separate from the establishment because they want to offer
an alternative to the establishment.
Further research should additionally look at smaller football teams in Germany because
this is where one can especially see political initiatives on both the far-left and far-right. This is
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quickly clear when looking at politically-oriented fan subcultures in Germany; there is a good
amount of research on St. Pauli, however, there is little research on Babelsberg 03. Smaller teams
are also interesting in regards to illegal or socially taboo political actions and expression because
being a fan of a smaller team means less surveillance, but enough so that ideas are perceived by a
wider audience. In addition to Babelsberg 03, other less-covered teams in Germany with
politically-oriented fans include Berliner FC Dynamo,424 BFC Türkiyemspor 1978, and Roter
Stern Kicker e.V. 05. Politically-oriented football fans are also not limited to Germany. Examples
of international teams with a large politically-based fan base include Celtic F.C. (Scotland), Zenit
St Petersburg (Russia), Hapoel Tel Aviv FC (Israel), and Seattle Sounders FC (USA). Further
research could compare and contrast politically-oriented football fan cultures around the world,
which could provide further insightful information regarding the impact of the German context
on Germany’s fans.
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Seattle Sounders FC fans in Seattle, Washington, USA show a loud and proud left-wing, antifascist-orientation.425

There are also key limitations to the current research that future research could seek to
amend. For one, this research was conducted in the United States due to the COVID-19
pandemic. As a part of the research process, sources were used that included first-hand
interviews with fans, such as Montague’s book, 1312: Among the Ultras. When possible,
on-the-ground research involving first-hand accounts is highly recommended to ensure the
integrity of the research. Furthermore, a large part of the football fan subculture remains
concealed to outside viewers—including researchers—because fans’ of fans’ taboo, illegal,
and/or extreme actions. Future research could look at the more concealed parts of the fan culture,
425
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but the extent to which researchers should is up for debate because of the ethical implications.
Data from future research could include being anonymous in regards to the fans’ and team
names, but determining how to conduct ethical research on this topic could prove beneficial for
further understanding Germany’s political (sub)culture(s) beyond voting results. This is because
some people cannot vote due to age or citizenship and some views are not expressed by political
candidates, especially ones that are extreme and/or illegal. Looking at different loci of political
culture where ideas can disseminated and gain traction through text and image—like through
football—can reveal more about the political views, prejudices, and potential occurrences in an
area. That is, looking at how many votes an area has for the AfD can be a predictor for how
far-right that area is, but when one looks at football fans, it can give one a more concrete idea of
what those on the far-right are supporting.
Overall, German football is more than a game: it is a place for community, artistic
expression, and entertainment. And through the combination of these, it is also a place for the
dissemination of political-expressions. The qualities which make football powerful,
politically-interrupting—both metaphorically and literally—and research-worthy are not
necessarily the players or the coaches, but the outsiders who gather around the sport. Davidson
puts it perfectly: “Football without the fans is nothing.”426
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